

Local Roots of Global Peace

June 24 and 25,
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Eurasia International
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Armenia

In essence, the globalized world has become both more and less peaceful. On the one hand, there is a strong trend of cooperation between states, international organizations and civil society groups on various global problems that defy purely state-centric responses. On the other hand, push-back from states on the grounds of state sovereignty and geo-politics has also been significant. Whether in post-war Central America or Western Balkans, political solutions to armed conflicts developed a tendency to mutate to terrorism, corruption and organized crime such as trafficking in humans, drugs and weapons. The purpose of this conference is to make sense of these seemingly disparate and contradictory trends.

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This is the conference proceedings from the “Local Roots of Global Peace” conference held in Yerevan, Armenia, on June 24-25, 2016. The papers included in this volume were delivered by their authors at the conference. The topics cover various areas of global security studies, ranging from human trafficking to refugee crisis from the Syrian war to third-party systems in ongoing and “frozen” conflicts around the world.

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DISCLAIMER

The opinions and arguments expressed in the materials below are solely the work of their individual authors/speakers and do not reflect those of the conference organizers.

Opening Notes

Welcome to the Local Roots of Global Peace conference on global security studies. I am Anna Ohanyan, Chair of Political Science and International Studies Department at Stonehill College in the United States. I am also a mother of three young daughters, and as a parent, concern for the security of my children is deep in my core. Indeed, security is perhaps the most primal and basic human need. It also represents the foundation of statehood, an institution built on the premise of guaranteeing security as individuals and members of national communities.

Traditionally, and historically, we have linked our security to bodies such as the police, the military, to borders, partly because real or perceived security threats emanated from neighbors; security threats were geographically confined and identifiable. The recent conflicts in the South Caucasus are a sober reminder that those understandings of security still prevail and are important.

The world still faces a long list of unresolved inter-state conflicts. However, the global data on armed conflict, over longer time scales, has also shown that currently we are in a period of relative decline in armed conflicts. Close examination also shows that this decline in armed conflict has been replaced by more globalized crimes, such as human trafficking, corporate crime, drug trafficking, and many others.

Despite the decline in traditional armed conflict, many analysts point to the concern that, for example, environmental problems will generate new types of conflict. Indeed, it is easy to forget the environmental roots of the Syrian civil war. Indeed, whether it is the Panama papers or the still raging drug wars in Mexico, it is becoming increasingly clear that the institutions of statehood worldwide are threatened, and that corruption worldwide is a security threat.

The schools in Sierra Leone in 2014 were closed but not due to war and violence, but due to the Ebola crisis. This year's Summer Olympics in Brazil has been under threat of cancellation not due to armed conflict, but due to a tiny mosquito carrying the Zika virus. In contrast, the Formula One racing event in Baku proceeded, despite the Four-Day conflict three months ago. Sipping coffee in the streets of Kiev while a conflict is raging in Eastern Ukraine is common. Terrorists, tourists and refugees are increasingly crossing paths, whether on the scenic shores of Lampadusa Island in Italy, Germany or France.

This conference seeks to address some of these seemingly contradictory trends. It seeks to recast and redefine local security problems in post-Communist Eurasia in a global light. The unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus have the capacity to become a global security threat. In addition, it also seeks to put the spotlight on global security threats that have manifested themselves in the South Caucasus and the Balkans; a woman killed in her home by her husband is not specific to Georgia or Serbia, but is part of a broader trend on violence against wom-

en; women remain one of the most vulnerable social groups around the world. The end of wars in the Balkans created an infrastructure of criminality in the region which has in turn been challenging governance in those states. As such, we want to ask the question: Whose security matters? The state or the individual? The soldier or the housewife? Who gets to define what security is? And why?

In this respect, Armenia is a perfect place to talk about global security issues. We are thrilled to be hosting presenters from six countries. And it is symbolic that my colleagues from Stonehill College and I came from Boston, in the United States, to Armenia to organize this conference here, in Yerevan. Working closely with our partners, EIU and EPF, and a tight network of discussants, it is our hope to create a mentored space for younger generation of scholars (I feel so old!!). It is our hope to contribute to the research capacities in social sciences in the region. Evidence-based and researched approaches are key if we are to solve some of deep rooted security problems in the region, whether the unresolved conflicts or corruption.

I have with me my four American students from Stonehill College. I am thankful to Armenia, to my colleagues, for allowing my American students to learn here, in Armenia, rubbing shoulders with local students, experts and analysts of global caliber. They have come here for their professional growth, not necessarily for the numerous cultural sites, which are excellent on their own right.

I would like to thank the discussants in this conference: they have been reading the student papers and will be providing valuable feedback to them to further the students' professional growth. We realize your tight schedules and are deeply appreciative for finding time to join us. Richard Giragosian and Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan altered their travel plans to be here for this conference.

I am deeply appreciative to EIU and EPF, for supporting us in so many ways. To the volunteers from EIU, a big thanks for running the conference so professionally! So great to see a student association at EIU!

Last but not least, Asya Hayrapetyan and Merri Shahbazyan have been keeping me sane by taking care of so many details and with such pleasure! Thank you!

Anna Ohanyan, Stonehill College

Unresolved Conflicts and Global Security

Session Chair and Discussant: Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Center



Regulation of the “Frozen Conflicts” in the South Caucasus: Ways and Perspectives

By Ani Hovasapyan, Moscow State Linguistic University, Russia

The end of the Cold war was marked by an increase of internal armed conflicts. Even though the overall number of the conflicts all over the world has recently decreased, internal conflicts are currently the main threat to global security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the status quo of the South Caucasus came to its end. A new system of interests and power balance was formed, and a precedent for the revision of the Belavezha Accords was documented. The Belavezha Accords proposed the inviolability of state borders and recognition of only federal republics as sovereign states. No autonomous region was to be recognized as a sovereign state.

Regulation of the “frozen conflicts” in the South Caucasus region may turn into a disaster for South Caucasian countries. The war of South Ossetia in August 2008 illustrated that winning a war does not always mean resolving a conflict. The process of “frozen conflict” regulation in the post-Soviet region is totally internationalized. The interests of competing geopolitical powers in the post-Soviet areas usually diverge. This condemns to failure all the undertaken peace processes. Thus, it is likely that for the foreseeable future the “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet area will remain “frozen,” as this state of affairs is beneficial for the main geopolitical actors of the modern world. The only alternative is the destabilization of the whole international system.

Key words: frozen conflict, Karabakh conflict, unrecognized states, conflict resolution, ceasefire agreement, self-determination, territorial integrity.

Introduction

Currently, there are three regions with frozen conflicts in South Caucasus, which have not been regulated. These regions are Abkhazia, NKR and South Ossetia. At first glance, the situation in the mentioned regions is analogous to the case of Kosovo. However, unlike Kosovo, no other self-declared post-Soviet state is under the protection of the United Nations and does not attract the attention of leading states and international organizations.

The unrecognized republics and their characteristics.

All the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus are connected with the expression of the will of various peoples from different areas to withdraw from the countries they are de jure part of, to become independent states or to join another country. Presently, these territories are considered to be unrecognized or partially recognized states. The following attributes are inherent for such states:

1. Post-Soviet unrecognized states have existed for more than twenty years. Examples of such states are Abkhazia, Karabakh, and South Ossetia. Their formation is directly related to the collapse of Soviet Union and a number of armed conflicts in the 1990s of the 20th century, which are not yet politically regulated.

2. The unrecognized states of the post-Soviet area occupy relatively small geographic areas. Moreover, even by European standards, their population is relatively low. South Ossetia occupies 3900 square kilometers. With a population of 70,000,¹ it is the smallest unrecognized state (for both geographic area and population indices) of the post-Soviet area. Abkhazia occupies 8600 square kilometers with a population of 250,000². The population of Nagorno-Karabakh is 146,600 and it occupies

¹ BBC Country Profiles: Regions and territories: South Ossetia, BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3797729.stm.

² Regions and territories: Abkhazia. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3797729.stm.

11 thousand square kilometers, including the six controlled regions.

3. Such numbers are crucial for these unrecognized states both from political and military perspectives. Most of these states were able to occupy and maintain territories only with the military and economic help of neighboring states, allies and with the intervention of the international community.

4. The fact that a state is not recognized by the international community is a legal feature of its status. Such state is deprived of active economic performance, profitable trading contracts, and realization of joint investment and infrastructural projects. Unrecognized states may only seek humanitarian aid and participate in social and cultural programs, while cooperation with various states and regions remains at its early stage. Hence, political and legal recognition of any territory ensures its existence and development.

5. Unrecognized formations of the South Caucasus share a common feature: they all have an external “patron” (Russia for Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh). Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic share ethnic bounds, whereas Moscow pursues only strategic interests in relation to Abkhazians and Ossetians. The international community is not sufficiently involved in all these cases. This has resulted in the escalation of conflict between Russia and Georgia, and may contribute to the escalation of confrontation regarding the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Legitimacy of the emergence of unrecognized states in the South Caucasus.

The pure fact of the existence of unrecognized states is a national trauma for state formations recognized by the international community. The present existence of Abkhazia and South Caucasus is not only an evidence of the inconsistency of the state of post-Soviet Georgia, but also proof of the failure of its ethno-political model, as well as a barrier to its Euro-Atlantic integration. The state, which has chosen to follow an ethnocentric model of development, cannot obtain a “visa” to Europe.

The existence of Nagorno-Karabakh (the most functioning unrecognized state in the post-Soviet area) is in turn an evidence of the political failure of independent Azerbaijan, an evidence which has lost sovereignty not only over the Karabakh areas, but also over five of its regions, as well as the partial loss of two regions. The ambiguity of the Armenian question is yet another factor limiting the activity of Azerbaijan on European and American stages. Hence, the incorporation of unrecognized formations by their “big brothers” is a priority for two independent states of the South Caucasus. This issue is even more fundamental and significant than economic modernization and the formation of an intra-political competitive environment. It is the regulation of the problem of breakaway territories that these independent states regard as a green light to the civilized world.

Two models of political legitimization for independence were used in the post-Soviet South Caucasus. Armenia has chosen a path of establishing a new state. Post-Soviet Armenia was not seeking political succession from the First Republic (1918 – 1920), thus emphasizing the existing traditions of Armenian national statehood. Azerbaijan and Georgia have chosen another path – **“to revive the historical succession”** and national statehood. On March 9, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR passed a resolution “On guarantees of the protection of Georgia’s state sovereignty”. The Supreme Soviet authority of Georgia politically and legally evaluated the invasion of the Red Army to Georgia in 1921, qualifying it as occupation and annexation. On June 20, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia called all the agreements and legal acts signed after the occupation of the country in 1921 illegal. The “Act of the Restoration of State Independence of Georgia” was passed on April 9, 1991³. Consequently, the new Georgia declared itself a successor of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918- 1921.⁴

In August, 1991, Azerbaijan declared the succession of the first Azerbaijan government, i.e., the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918 – 1920)⁵. Thereupon, both Georgia and Azerbaijan rejected the legal basis of the Soviet period, which was at the same time regulating the territorial composition.

3 Свободная Грузия, 1991, 10 апр.

4 Jones, S.F, *The making of Modern Georgia, 1918-2012*, (2014) New York: Penguin, p. 318-319.

5 Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan Republic on “Re-establishment of the State Independence of the Azerbaijan Republic,” (1991, August 31), Bakinski Rabochi.

However, the nuance here is that during the period of independence of both Georgia and Azerbaijan, they did not have sovereignty over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

The impact of the April event on the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Because of the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in April 2016, the international community once again turned its attention to this Caucasian region. Currently, interest in the conflict has increased because of the Turkish factor, as well as the selective cooperation of Russia and the West. Although the geopolitical aspects of this conflict are quite significant, the primary cause and focus is the competing interests of the people in the region. This means that regulation first of all depends on these people. At the beginning of May, the Cabinet of Ministers in the Republic of Armenia approved new governmental legislation on the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh. This made many political analysts claim that Yerevan was about to follow the scenario of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the mentioned legislation simply stated that recognition is conditional on “further developments, including the outer factors.” Consequently, for now it is too early to state that Yerevan is ready to unreservedly support the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Leaving aside the formal legal aspect of the conflict, it is quite crucial to understand the role and the significance of Nagorno-Karabakh in this conflict in order to come up with appropriate steps and algorithms for regulation. Nagorno-Karabakh is regarded as the

most functional unrecognized state in the South Caucasus: it has established governmental and management structures; the army is one of the most efficient ones in the region; the state has inner legitimacy; elections are held; the state has a Constitution and many other features. It is the only state to receive funding from the United States budget. With the support of the active Armenian Diaspora, even back in the period of “perestroika,” the West perceived the Nagorno-Karabakh independence movement as a protest against Stalin’s national policy and the Soviet Union’s repressive apparatus. Such a perception was much simplified, though it had its political consequences.

Since 1998, Karabakh has received assistance from USAID, the volume of which is predetermined by the United States Congress. According to the US Department of State, representatives’ evaluation, Nagorno-Karabakh differs from other unrecognized states due to its development rate and the abilities of the country’s armed forces. US administration has adopted a realistic approach to the examination of Nagorno-Karabakh compared to such regions as Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan and Taiwan. The US has started elaborating various options to confer a legal status on these territories. A number of state parliaments (including Massachusetts, Maine, California) in the United States, the highest representative body of the New Southern Wales state in Australia, and the regional parliament of the Basque region adopted the resolution in support of Nagorno-Karabakh, asking the central authorities to recognize its independence. Indeed, these were symbolic actions; however, we should not underes-

timate the power of public opinion in the state decision-making process in Western states. Many experts assume that even if Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized by individual countries, other unrecognized states or governmental units, it will not have any diplomatic or political benefits, as the voice of superpowers is the only matter. Nevertheless, in my opinion, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the same strategy as in the promotion of the Armenian Genocide recognition should be adopted, i.e., a step-by-step approach. Such actions will regularly showcase the world that Azerbaijani claims on Nagorno-Karabakh do not correspond to reality.

Presently, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is not regarded as a post-Soviet proxy war between Russia and the West, and Karabakh is not considered to be Moscow's puppet. This provides enough space for action while at the same time preserving relationships with Russia, the US and the EU.

During the escalation of the conflict in April, Armenia and Karabakh did not receive support and were not condemned for preserving the status-quo (otherwise it would be hard to avoid the repetition of the scenario in Serbian Krajina in 1995⁶). Azerbaijan was forced to admit the failure of its military aggression. Even at the cost of hundreds of lives, Baku was not able to realize its plan. It aimed to occupy at least a few regions in Nagorno-Karabakh to later impose its terms on the Armenian

6 On August 4, 1995, the Croatian Army launched "Operation Storm," an offensive to retake the Krajina region, which had been controlled by separatist ethnic Serbs since early 1991. The offensive, which lasted a mere thirty-six hours, resulted in the death of an estimated 526 Serbs.

side at the negotiation table. This was not the result. Moreover, the meeting in Vienna revealed that Azerbaijan was party to a compromise. After so many years, it was forced to agree to implement a mechanism aimed to investigate the incidents on the border. Azerbaijan also contests the necessity of implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 1994 and 1995, which was particularly emphasized by the Minsk group co-chair countries. The deputy of the head of Azerbaijan's presidential administration stated that "Azerbaijan agreed to the consolidation of the ceasefire for further negotiations during the meeting in Vienna."⁷ Here we see that Azerbaijan points not to the agreement of 1994 and 1995, but to the verbal agreement on the ceasefire of April 5, though they do not openly state this.

Many scholars of this particular conflict assume that the present situation of "neither war, nor peace" and ongoing process of "unfreezing" conflict is favorable for the governments of both countries; it "serves as a tool to fight against dissidence and consolidation of power." Armenia expects the international community to accept the existing situation, whereas Azerbaijan presumes that it will be able to take revenge after the growth of the economy resulting from the trading of energy resources.

When it came to the threat of escalation of ethnic tensions, for a long time, the international community adopted a policy of state territorial integrity. The year 2008 became a turning point in the change of international relations: the indepen-

⁷ Haqqin.az (2016, May 18) quotes Novruz Mammadov, Deputy Head of the Azerbaijani President Administration, Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Administration.

dence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia was recognized, which meant recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.

The analytical community and the political circles of the superpowers are more and more receptive to the need to change the geopolitical configurations in the South Caucasus, including the unrecognized states, as well as developing further relations not only with the three internationally recognized states, but also unrecognized ones.

Conclusion

As a result of the conducted research we may state the following:

1. Unrecognized states are an integral part of modern international policy. As a rule, the emergence of such states is a consequence of various ethnic or confessional (regional) conflicts.

2. The basis of the conflicts in the South Caucasus is the desire of ethnic groups to preserve their culture and unity through political determination. The fact that, in the modern world, there are tenfold more ethnic constituencies than sovereign states, makes the problem of inter-ethnic conflicts salient for the whole international community.

3. The process of negotiations with the help of mediators (a third party state or international organization) is the most widespread method of ethnic conflict regulation. Still, the analysis of contradictions in the South Caucasus has revealed the

effectiveness of the present method in the cessation of hostilities as well as its incapability of leading to a final settlement of ethnic conflicts. The negotiation process throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has created a situation of “neither war, nor peace” for a long period of time, whereas it failed to prevent the outbreak of military operations in South Ossetia in August 2008 and Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016.

4. The compromise within the framework of territorial integrity in the post-Soviet countries is negligible. The plans for regulation within various federal projects are not popular, and among the metropolis elites, unrecognized states are frequently rejected. Parent states initially took an intransigent position in regard to this question. Recently, unrecognized republics have declined all possible attempts to negotiate on this topic.

5. The uncompromising position of the authorities of conflicting sides is the main obstacle to a final regulation of the status and future of Nagorno-Karabakh. Any concession by one of the parties is regarded as an expression of authority; sometimes even the people view it as a defeat. However, despite the fact that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh has been for 20 years, the republic demonstrates its independence, commitment to democracy and its right to stand among the other subjects of the international community.

Based on the conducted research the following possibilities for the resolution of “frozen” conflicts in the South Caucasus are suggested:

1. The realization of self-determination. This is in essence unilateral recognition and even possible joining of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia, and of Karabakh to Armenia. Russia has already recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia; uniting these territories (as is now under discussion) will undoubtedly give rise to a new imperial mindset among the authorities. Additionally, Russia will most likely be left without support on the international level, as in this scenario the territorial integrity of Georgia would be disrupted. This in turn suggests a diversion from the Helsinki Agreement, which with the case of Kosovo may create a new precedent for various separatist movements all over the world.

We may suggest that the US, various EU countries, and a number of CIS countries will openly demonstrate their discontent with Russia's actions in this case and will not recognize the disruption of Georgian territorial integrity. The "Asian giants," China and India, will not support Russia either, as they have issues with separatist territories. Such developments will negatively affect Armenia as well. As in the case of Russia, the world will be forced to accept unilateral recognition, but joining Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia will give birth to a wave of dissatisfaction. At first, Armenia will be excluded from all the integration groupings in the post-Soviet region, particularly from the CSTO, which is of vital importance to the country. Neither Lukashenko nor Nazarbaev will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Armenia; neither is ready to cooperate in the collective security system with the government, a part of which is under

the threat of invasion. Parallels with the Crimea case are irrelevant. Minsk and Astana do not recognize Crimea as part of the Russian Federation; however, they do realize that they will not have to fight for this illegitimate part of Russia. On the contrary, they will have to fight for Karabakh, as the only solution left to Aliev will be a war.

2. Achieving a very convincing victory on the part of the unrecognized state, as the lost side, “the metropolis state,” would not be able to have any claims for the separated territories. The Kosovo case is an appropriate example.

3. Low intensity conflict, where the lost side cannot accept the situation as it is and cannot have any hopes for military or political revenge in order to return the separated territory. Such an example of a “frozen conflict” is the Karabakh case. A similar case is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both these conflicts are not classified as typically “frozen,” as we observe the reluctance of this or that side to accept the current situation. Therefore, the conflicts remain in a state of slow progress.

Consequently, none of the above mentioned scenarios suit the conflict cases in the South Caucasus. One thing is certain: the South Caucasian conflicts may be regulated only through the cooperation of the conflicting sides. Yet, the conflicts in the South Caucasus, particularly Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the situation in Syria, Iraq, and the inner conflicts of Turkey, remain instruments for the resolution of global issues.

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From Conflict to Peace

The Issues of Post-Conflict Stateness as a Global Security Threat:

The Case of Non-Recognized States of Post-Soviet Space

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The establishment of a state is the main aim of each nation, as the primary mechanism of its safety, prosperity and natural development. It is noteworthy that in the second half of the 20th century after the establishment of the UN Charter and as a result of significant developments in international law, the people's right to self-determination was recognized as the *erga omnes* and *jus cogens* norm⁸ of international law and two active periods of state-building were recorded. The first was the decolonization wave of the 1960s and 70s, as a result of which more than seventy new states were established.⁹ The second was at the beginning of the 1990s, when, after the col-

⁸ Torosyan, T. (2008), Settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the frameworks of International Law, Tigran Mets: Yerevan.

⁹ United Nations Judicial Yearbook 1980, p. 182-183.

lapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, more than two dozen countries declared independence. However, the experience of both the countries established in the second half of the 20th century and the countries established before then shows that the establishment of a state does not automatically lead to security, prosperity and natural development. Moreover, current situations and development tracks are diverse, which makes it even more difficult to improve the complex and at the same time fragile system of global security. Some of these countries declared independence immediately, whereas the others still remained non-recognized. The aforementioned problems are especially drastic for the South Caucasus region, as three out of the six states are non-recognized.

However, the issue of recognition wasn't the toughest one for the Post-Soviet space, as each country also had to face peculiar challenges brought about by the processes of state-building and stateness. Some states had to undergo these challenges alongside with the unprecedented system crisis in world history – post-Soviet transformation and the deepening of the globalization process. These states also suffered the consequences of an armed conflict. It was in these circumstances that they undertook the processes of post-conflict state-building and stateness. All three recognized and three non-recognized countries of the region were engaged in armed conflict and are currently facing problems brought about by these as yet “unresolved,” “frozen” conflicts, living in fear of the conflicts “getting hotter.” The April war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which took the lives in only

four days of hundreds of soldiers and civilians, was a manifestation of these problems.

In the context of the events of the last two decades, the problems of stateness became even more evident. Scientific instruments, models and indexes are of pivotal importance; through their further amendment, the fettle of stateness can be evaluated and its shortcomings discovered.

Opportunities for the Assessment of Stateness

In political science, there have been a number of empirical studies dedicated to the issues of stateness so far. There has been great controversy on the subject since the second half of the previous century. Throughout these studies, the general principles of stateness procedures and empirical models, as well as the factors deciding the national and typological features, have been and are being shaped. The term “stateness” was first suggested by J. Nettl in his article “The state as a conceptual variable,”¹⁰ published in 1968, where he mainly focused on the independence of the variables of “stateness” and “nationness”.

The concept of stateness remains indistinct, as further work on its conceptualization and operationalization is needed,¹¹ The diversity of the viewpoints on the concept of “stateness” can be clearly demonstrated by the study of works dedicated to this issue: studies dedicated to the issue of stateness focus on defining separate components of the stateness process (conceptual

¹⁰ Nettl, J., The State as a Conceptual Variable (1968)World politics 20:4, p. 559-592.

¹¹ Мелешкина Е.. (2011)Исследования государственной состоятельности: какие уроки мы можем извлечь? – Политическая наука 2.

definitions of statehood, conceptualization and institutionalization of communities' political construction, search for strategic types of stateness, the process of creation of states and nations), but comprehensive conceptual works and empirical comparisons are still missing.¹²

The complexity of the solution of the aforementioned problem is conditioned by a number of other factors as well. While discussing the features and capabilities of this or that state, the researchers quite often use such vague words as “strong” and “weak.”¹³ It is noteworthy that the perceptions of various authors about the formulations “strong” and “weak” greatly differ from one another, from the efficient functioning of the state apparatus to government's apparent intervention to society's life, authoritarian governance, a developed public sector and the ability to prohibit extensive external influence.¹⁴

Sometimes authors use controversial concepts such as “control”, “power of state” or “weakness of state,” “failed states,” “fragile states” and other formulations of this sort. In a number of studies, the aforementioned expressions, used to characterize a country or a group of countries, are substantiated by documentation. However, the empirical model, assessment tool and clear fixation of data of the studied phenome-

12 Պետրոսյան, Վ., (2016) Հետխորհրդային տարածքի չճանաչված պետությունների կայացման դժվարություններն ու հեռանկարները: ԼՂՀ դեպքը, Անտարես, Երևան.

13 Мелешкина, Е., *op. cit.*

14 Lauridsen, L. (1991)The debate on the developmental state // Development theory and the role of the state in third world countries. J. Martinussen (ed.).Roskilde university centre: Roskilde, p. 108–133.

non are often missing. Additionally, the use of such words and phrases in empirical studies may lead to distortion of notions¹⁵ and, what is even more hazardous, to arbitrary interpretation of research results for political purposes¹⁶.

In political sciences there exist two types of assessments of stateness:

- ***Assessment of segregated fields of stateness by separate indexes***¹⁷, which allows for a detailed and throughout study of each field of the state, giving the opportunity to identify and whereat to rectify the problems and shortcomings existing in that field.
- ***Assessment on stateness by integral models***¹⁸, which gives the opportunity to present the full

15 Сартори, Дж. (2003) Искажение концептов в сравнительной политологии. Полис 3. Москва.

16 Мелешкина, Е. op. cit.

17 Worldwide Governance Indicators, The World Bank Group, Retrieved from: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> (accessed May 14, 2016); Human Development Index, United Nations Development Programme, Retrieved from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/>(accessed May 14, 2016); State Fragility Index and War List, Center for Systemic Peace, Retrieved from: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm> (accessed May 14, .2016); Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation in Partnership with Wall Street Journal, Retrieved from: <http://www.heritage.org/index/>(accessed May 12, 2016); Political Atlas of the Modern World/ Melville A., Polunin, Y., Ilyin, M., Mironyuk, M., Timofeev, I., Meleshkina, E., Vaslavskii, Y. (2010). Southern Gate: Willey and Blackwell.

18 Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, Available from: <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/> (accessed May 15, 2016); Стукал, Д., Хавенсон, Т. (2012) Моделирование государственной состоятельности постсоциалистических стран, ПОЛИТЕКС 1.; Мельвиль А., Стукал, Д. (2011) Условия демократии и пределы демократизации. Факторы режимных изменений в посткоммунистических странах: опыт сравнительного и многомерного статистического анализа, Полис 3.

picture of stateness of this or that state by exploring all the fields of stateness together.

For the formation of a complete notion of stateness for both recognized and non-recognized states, an integral model of assessment should be used. In the framework of our project, taking into account the key functions and prerequisites of state-building and stateness as well as the study of segregated field assessment models and integral assessment models of stateness, an attempt will be made to present an integral model of assessment of stateness, which will be applicable both for recognized and non-recognized states. Within the scope of the model, a precise methodology will be developed which will try to undertake particular amendments of all the aforementioned faults detected during the study of the assessment models. At the same time, importantly, it will take into account the peculiarities and difficulties surrounding the assessment of the post-conflict stateness of non-recognized states.

It is also noteworthy that the issue of the post-conflict stateness of non-recognized states has not yet been studied and has not been assessed using either a segregated field assessment (except for “Freedom in the World”) or an integral assessment (which is actually one of the major problems surrounding the assessment of the stateness of non-recognized states). Hence, it is necessary to study what additional challenges and difficulties the prefix “non” brings with it, in addition to the existing difficulties surrounding the assessment of stateness.

The Challenges of Post-Conflict State-Building and Stateness: The “Perfect Guarantees” for Global Non-Stability

The issues of stateness and its opposite manifestations - state fragility and state failure - can be rightfully considered as modern threats to global security. The “Global War on Terrorism” has brought forth new concerns about the security threats created because of fragility and instability, which has added new concepts to international processes and a much stronger focus on the interconnection between security and development.¹⁹ It is noteworthy that some aspects of globalization - primarily since the 1970s –have had negative effects on the “willingness” of the elite to support state-building and stateness processes in “fragile” and “poor” states. We can distinguish some of them:

- The rents received from the exports of illicit goods reduce the elite’s interest in developing a positive state-society relationship.
- The modern structure of international finance has facilitated the withdrawal of capital from the state.
- The thriving global commercial market for military and security services undermines the process of centralisation of security capacity in weak states. It also stimulates the elite to “pri-

¹⁹ Brinkerhoff, D., Capacity Development in Fragile States: Dilemmas and Directions, Capacity.Org 32.

vatize security,” rather than provide it as a public good.²⁰

- The continually developing market for arms and the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which becomes an important driving force for armed conflict and armed violence within and across state boundaries.²¹

In the aforementioned circumstances, the elite should make a crucial decision whether to “survive” for some time through “brutal” strategy and gain as much profit as possible, or, under domestic and global pressure, become more responsive to the establishment and development of respect towards human rights in their state and act in accordance with the duties undertaken by the state²². Unfortunately, the elite, as a rule, tends to choose the first, i.e. “more pleasant,” variant.

Difficulties Pertaining to the Assessment of Stateness of Non-Recognized States

- The assessment of post-conflict stateness is also abundant with precise challenges and difficulties, particularly:

20 Moore, M., Schmidt, A., Unsworth, S. (2009), Assuring Our Common Future in a Globalised World: The Global Context of Conflict and State Fragility, DFID background paper for the 2009 White Paper “Securing our Common Future.”

21 OECD (2009a), Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development, OECD DAC, Paris.

22 OECD (2009a), op. cit.

- The only model that represents the assessment of non-recognized states is “Freedom in the World,” which is a segregated field assessment model and thus does not refer to other fields which are of pivotal importance for the assessment of stateness of this or that country.
- Some drawbacks are detected in the existing indices themselves.
- There is a lack and in some cases a total absence of information. It is extremely difficult to find the necessary information in the official websites of non-recognized states; particularly, extensive difficulties arose while reviewing the non-recognized states of Post-Soviet space. Exceptions are the official websites of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
- The scientific articles, monographs and publications dedicated to non-recognized states are few and contradictory, whereas these countries also have need for an evaluation and review of their process of stateness.
- In terms of the absence of statistical data (assessment indexes, official data, scientific articles and monographs concerning non-recognized states) the assessment of stateness of non-recognized states should be carried out mainly by expert analysis, which for its part leads to the problems that expert assessment brings with it.

- There is a problem with the equivalence of assessment criteria for all the states, whether recognized or non-recognized.

Perspectives on the Assessment of Stateness of Non-Recognized States: “Peace to the World Index”

The solutions to the aforementioned problems require a set of comprehensive actions. The first step should be the presentation of an integral model of assessment of stateness, the main evaluative and analytical tool of which should be the “stateness” – the state’s capacity for performing its main functions and becoming a full member of the international community and a subject of international law.

The index aims to represent an integral model of assessment of stateness, which will be applicable both for recognized and non-recognized states, and will give the opportunity to compare the levels of stateness both within the countries of Post-Soviet space and of the whole world. The creation of a model, which will have a practical implementation, can become a helpful tool for identifying existing and potential problems. Integral assessments of stateness allow for the recording of both progress and regress in all the fields of stateness, thus giving the states and international community an opportunity to focus on problem areas and to promptly undertake their solution process. Such an approach would allow the international community to fight against security threats and destabilization, thereby fostering peace and security (which conditioned the name of the index).

Crossing Borders and Global Security

Session Chair: Naira Sahakyan, Yerevan State University

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The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Armenia

By Narek Grigoryan, Yerevan State University, Armenia

The Syrian war has been going on for five years, but only in 2015 has Europe woken up to the flow of Syrian refugees. Now the Syrian Refugee Crisis is one of the worst universal problems the world has seen since after the end of the Second World War. In 2014, the UN Refugee Agency Annual Report indicated that the total number of forcibly displaced persons rose to a record high level. A primary cause of this displacement is the ongoing civil war in Syria. In 2014, Syria replaced Afghanistan as the world's largest source of refugees.²³ In such situations, it is always difficult to determine just how many people are looking

²³ Groll, E. (2015, June 18) A Record Year in Misery: The World Has Never Seen a Refugee Crisis This Bad, Foreignpolicy.com, Retrieved from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/18/a-record-year-in-misery-the-world-has-never-seen-a-refugee-crisis-this-bad/> (accessed June 18, 2015).

for asylum. Indeed, according to official figures, almost half a million people applied for asylum in 2015 in Germany alone, though more than double this amount are reported to have arrived in the country before they could make asylum claims.²⁴

Europe is currently facing an exceptional wave of migration coming from its southern border. The images of refugees desperately trying to cross through Hungary to reach other European countries have been reprinted on the cover of newspapers across the world. The tragedy of the crisis became symbolically represented by the picture of a 3-year-old Syrian boy named Aylan, whose body washed ashore on the Turkish coast.

If many countries and superpowers are apprehensive of the crisis in Syria in global terms, for the Republic of Armenia, this crisis is first and foremost about the safety of Syrian Armenians. Indeed, like many other states Armenia also has its political interests in the Middle East: the Syrian crisis has evoked serious concerns on the horizon of Armenian foreign policy as well. In the meantime, Armenia, a country the size of Belgium with 3 million inhabitants, has been welcoming refugees fleeing from war and persecution. The Syrian refugee exodus has reminded Armenians of their own tragic history, which, in the eyes of some, explains the moral and historic duty of the country to open its doors and offer a safe place to the refugees. The majority of those coming to Armenia are descendants of Armenians

²⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart-crisis-context>.

who escaped the Genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks in 1915, and were given refuge in Syria.²⁵

Until the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the country's Armenian community, by various estimates, numbered over 100,000. More than 60,000 of them settled in Aleppo, with smaller communities in Kessab, Qamishli, Yacubiyah, Kobane and Damascus. Only up to 10,000 of them reportedly remain in the war-ravaged country. Many are said to be unable to flee the war zone.

The significance of the Armenians in the economic life of Syria goes far beyond the small community. They distinguish themselves in their traditional crafts as jewelers, photographers, craftsmen, souvenir shop-owners, and tour guides, but are also employed in medicine, education and other professions. A considerable number of community members work in the patriarchal institutes as clerks, librarians, teachers, printing press workers and porters. The Armenians have preserved Armenian as their spoken language, keeping their national and cultural heritage and a separate communal and social life. Despite their involvement in the economic and religious life of Syria, the Armenians seldom establish contacts with non-Armenians beyond business and professional relationships. At the same time, Armenian authors who survived the Genocide were called to the extraordinary task of rethinking their role as intellectuals in Armenian Diaspora of Syria. Together with the US, France,

²⁵ Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/luna-atamian-/armenia-and-the-syrian-re_b_9361844.html .

Egypt and Lebanon, Syria soon emerged as one of the centers of rebirth for Armenian literature production. In Aleppo, in particular, Armenian literary life was reactivated by a promising generation of young survivors of Genocide, including Vahe Vahian, Simon Simonian and Andranik Zaroukian²⁶.

The mass inflow of Syrian Armenians into Armenia started in 2012. Initially, many Syrians fled from their war-torn country to neighboring states. Many refugees expected that the situation would be resolved quickly, allowing them to return to their home country. However, after hopes of the situation improving in Syria were dashed, many ethnic Armenians decided to seek secure and stable refuge in their native Armenia. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Armenia has accepted around 20,000 refugees, which in absolute terms makes it the European country with the third biggest number of refugees from Syria.²⁷ In relative terms, compared to its population as well as the GDP per capita (which is over 10 times lower than the EU average), Armenia is by far the first European country leading the effort in hosting Syrians. Armenia welcomes almost 6 newcomers per 1000 inhabitants, compared with 4 in Sweden and just 1 in Germany. For Syria's ethnic Armenians, Armenia represents a safe choice - not only as an ancient homeland and predominantly Christian country - but also one with migration

26 Migliorino, N. (2008)(Re) Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis, *Studies in forced migration* 21, New York: Oxford, p. 66.

27 Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart-crisis-context>.

policies and a repatriation program that make it easy for them to settle. It is noteworthy that the first immigration wave into Armenia was triggered by the war in Syria and the wave has not only continued but intensified since attacks by ISIS have started. The Armenian administration was quick to recognize the seriousness of the Syrian crisis and moved to pass appropriate conditions. To facilitate access to information about applicable procedures, the Foreign Ministry published an English-language guidebook.²⁸ Armenia's approach to the plight of refugees stands in stark contrast with many EU member states. There are no prescribed "welcome centers" in Armenia as such. Armenia's own economic woes mean that it struggles to provide accommodation and jobs for the newly-arrived Syrians. State assistance for Syrian Armenians mainly covers education, medical care and the provision of documents. When the Civil War began, there were direct flights between Aleppo and Yerevan, but those have since been cut off. Now, Armenians are forced to utilize underground smuggling networks to Lebanon, and fly to Armenia from there.

Armenia is one of the few European countries with an operating embassy in Syria's capital, Damascus, where security concerns pushed most European countries to close down their diplomatic missions in 2012. Armenia's consulate in Aleppo (where a sizable part of the Syrian Armenian community is based) also remains open despite continuous bombing of the city.

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Handbook of frequently asked legal questions: For persons displaced from Syria to Armenia, (2014, September) Yerevan. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/syria_brochure_eng.pdf/.

Armenia offers a right of return to all ethnic Armenians who seek to return to the land of their ancestors via a simplified procedure. According to the Huffington Post, while most of the Syrian refugees fleeing to Armenia are Armenians, Assyrians and Yazidis have also been welcomed into the country. Anahit Khosroeva, an Assyrian community activist, leading researcher at the Institute of History and former professor of Chicago University, stated: “We were told by the migration service authorities that the Assyrians would be helped and protected in Armenia just like the Syrian Armenian refugees.”²⁹

Besides the existing socio-economic difficulties in the country, Armenia faced an escalating armed conflict with Azerbaijan in April, 2016. Having a limited capacity to absorb newcomers and cater for their needs, Armenia offers several protection measures, including simplified naturalization for 15,000 Syrian refugees.

The crisis of refugees in Armenia needs an urgent response. Armenia urgently needs international support to deal with the crisis UNHCR Armenian office in providing house rentals to new arrivals for three to six months. The projects implemented by Red Cross Armenia, Save the Children and other organizations cannot cover all humanitarian needs of affected populations. Reports by the Armenian government so far indicate that currently about 10,000 Syrian refugees are registered as vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance.

²⁹ Retrieved from <http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/middle-east/the-arab-world/analysis-the-role-of-armenia-in-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-21221> .

There have been families that have returned to Syria due to hardship establishing a new life in Armenia. Due to incomplete data and lack of government capability to record refugee flows, there are only partial assessments on the number of the Syrians currently residing in Armenia.

Nevertheless, Armenian authorities seem determined to continue assisting Syrian refugees while many places are closing their doors to them. During a visit to the United States in March 2016, President Serzh Sarkisian stated that Armenia is ready to receive more ethnic Armenian refugees from Syria and hopes that its affluent Diaspora in the West will assist in their resettlement. He also stated that Yerevan also hopes to secure financial assistance to them from foreign governments and international donor agencies.

On a more positive note, this humanitarian crisis has also shown that there is a European community of values which stretches from the South Caucasus to the Atlantic. This community is not defined by membership to a particular customs union, but by common principles which countries and their people hold dear. Throughout the refugee crisis, Armenia is quietly reminding the world what European values really are. History shows that Europe has been at its best when it has provided shelter for those seeking safety from persecution and destruction normative. The Armenian approach to the current crisis is a direct continuation of this praiseworthy tradition, and proves that Armenia is fully and undeniably part of the European community of values.



An Overview of Anti-Trafficking Action in Serbia

By Katherine Wahrer, Stonehill College, USA

It is estimated that there are 27 million slaves in the world today; this means there are more people enslaved today than ever before (Bales, 2005). Modern day slavery constitutes a branch of the overarching problem of human trafficking, which the United Nations (UN) defines as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by improper means (such as force, abduction, fraud, or coercion) for an improper purpose including forced labor or sexual exploitation” (Bales, Trodd & Williamson, 2009).

Serbia, a destination, transit and source country for human trafficking, has undergone great societal transitions within the last thirty years (ASTRA, 2016). During the wars and civil unrest of the 1990s, people became displaced and vulnerable to human trafficking. In addition, with the increasing privatization of socially owned sectors, Serbia experienced a growth in unemployment, especially among women who worked “traditional” jobs. Because of this, it is not surprising that females make up 70% of the victim population in Serbia, suggesting a correlation

between female unemployment and the rate of human trafficking (Danailova-Trainor & Patrick, 2006). However, in contrast to this displacement of women, some women became the main “breadwinner” when their husbands lost their jobs, which has also led to an increase in domestic violence (ASTRA, 2015). It is estimated that “every other woman in Serbia experiences mental violence in family, every third suffer physical violence and every fourth is threatened by violence” (ASTRA, 2016, p.1).

Anti-Trafficking Action (ASTRA) was the first non-governmental organization (NGO) in Serbia to actively combat human trafficking. Today, this research has identified over 50 organizations currently active in anti-trafficking action (ASTRA, 2016).³⁰ However, even with these actors, Serbia is still a Tier 2 country, with human trafficking remaining an immense issue (US TIP Report, 2015). The Center for Human Trafficking Victims Protection (CHTVP) only officially identified 40 victims in 2015 (CHTVP, 2015). This number is a significant decrease from the 125 that were identified in 2014 (CHTVP, 2014).

A potential reason for the number of unidentified victims could be that men tend to not seek help; they do not see themselves as “victims” of trafficking. As one employee of a local NGO stated, male pride makes it hard for them to come forward (Interview; May 5, 2016). Males are being increasingly trafficked in Serbia, with the amount of forced labor increasing; therefore, it is important to eradicate these views that make coming for-

³⁰ E-mail: kwahrer@students.stonehill.edu for list of all the actors identified in this paper.

ward difficult (Center for Youth Integration, 2014). Additionally, child trafficking in Serbia is increasing, composing almost 50% of the victims identified. This could contribute to the amount of unidentified victims, owing to fact that the government of Serbia, and thus the CHTVP, do not recognize child marriages as trafficking due to it being considered part of Roma culture. For this reason, several employees of local NGOs describe the CHTVP as relying too heavily on a certain checklist of identifiers and being too rigid, thus preventing the identification of more victims (Interview, May 31, 2016).

Moreover, NGOs and governmental institutions in Serbia do not seem to cooperate in the efforts to end human trafficking (US TIP Report, 2013). For example, in 2014, only eight of the 125 victims were referred to ASTRA by the CHTVP, and in 2015 only three were referred to them (ASTRA, 2015). The Serbian government is also criticized by the United States Trafficking in Persons Report (US TIP) (2015) and the Human Rights Defense Center (2007) for not having a current National Action Plan or Strategy to combat human trafficking. There is a need to implement the already-drafted National Strategy or National Action Plan (Interviews; May 5, 2016).

All anti-trafficking actors, including the NGOs, need improvement. Three employees of local NGOs stated that there needs to be specialized care for child victims; there are currently no such services (Interview, April 25, 2016). Specialized programs for men are lacking as well. Another criticism of the current anti-trafficking actions is that there is too much focus

on preventative work instead of re-integration. Surtees (2008) argues that programs are not looking at the full picture of human trafficking, while Breuil et al., (2011) argue that the programs are taking an approach that focuses too much on “naive” victims, whereas some victims are aware of the risk of trafficking. Both of these critiques, along with Danailova-Trainor and Patrick (2006), suggest that preventive programs should focus on macro level determinants of the problem, i.e. creating more of a job market and thus decreasing the unemployment rate.

Current Research

The current research compiled a sample of the anti-trafficking actions in Serbia over the past 14 years. The Serbian Anti-Trafficking Action Dataset (SATAD)³¹ was created using open source material from ASTRA and snowball sampling other open source materials³². The analysis of SATAD allowed the current study to make several observations about the methods of actions, the types of actions, the intended beneficiaries of these actions and the timeline of anti-trafficking actions in Serbia between 2002 and 2016. Additionally, the research examined the relationship of the methods of anti-trafficking actions per year as well as the types of anti-trafficking actions per year. Interviews with employees of local anti-trafficking actors allowed for a more contextual analysis of the findings. After an analysis of these relationships and the qualitative data from the in-

31 To gain access to the SATAD e-mail kwahrer@students.stonehill.edu.

32 For a full list of the open-source material analyzed e-mail kwahrer@students.stonehill.edu.

terviews, the findings are discussed, exploring what they may mean and what next steps should be taken to help fight against human trafficking.

In this paper, anti-trafficking actions will consist of any initiative taken to combat human trafficking in Serbia. The research specifically labeled each action in terms of the method of action and the type of action. The methods of actions in this paper are defined as the form of these actions and their implementation techniques, e.g. lectures, programs, etc. Types of actions are defined as the overall goal of the action. To understand the trends in the data, a descriptive analysis was conducted focusing on eight questions: How many anti-trafficking actions were in each subsection of the method activities³³; How many anti-trafficking actions were in each subsection of the method trainings; How many anti-trafficking actions, out of SATAD, belonged in each category of methods of actions; How many anti-trafficking actions, out of SATAD, belonged in each category of the types of actions; Who were the intended beneficiaries of the actions in the SATAD; What was the amount of anti-trafficking actions per year; What was the relationship of the methods of actions per year and what was the relationship of types of actions per year.

Discussion

While reading the current study it is important to remember that the research has several limitations. It is unlikely that the sample is representative of all the actions that took place in

³³ A one time action being done with the intent to help combat human trafficking in some way.

Serbia from 2002-2016. This is partially due to the difficulty in compiling an exhaustive dataset on this subject. To obtain the information, both SATAD and the interview sample were composed through snowball sampling, thus presenting external validity issues.

The findings of the current study convey multiple characteristics about the fight against human trafficking in Serbia. Perhaps most importantly, all of the data convey that Serbia is actively trying to combat human trafficking. To be more specific, there is an average of at least 16 anti-trafficking actions going on within Serbia per year (See Chart F³⁴). The findings also highlight the unique context in Serbia. For example, there were few actions in Serbia in 2002 and shortly thereafter, because that was when NGOs first started to organize in Serbia. Additionally, the actions typically spiked in the years from 2009 until 2012, as conveyed through Chart G and Chart H. This could be due to the National Action plan for the Fight Against Human Trafficking, which was adopted in Serbia's legislation from 2009-2011³⁵. Furthermore, the drop after 2012 could be explained by Serbia's lack of implementing a National Action Plan or National Strategy in the following years³⁶. In fact, a National Strategy to combat human trafficking was drafted but never adopted in 2014, thus

34 To view the charts of this paper e-mail kwahrer@students.stonehill.edu.

35 A National Action Plan is a legal framework that is drafted with the aim to combat human trafficking on a legislative level. In order to do this, the Action Plan contains specific objectives and goals to accomplish the goal of combating human trafficking on a specific timeline and is generally a short term plan.

36 A National Strategy is a legal framework that is drafted with the aim to combat human trafficking on a legislative level, however by implementing a National Strategy it will systematically help combat human trafficking through accomplishing general goals within Serbia in the long term.

potentially explaining why there was a drop in 2013, a spike in 2015 and again a drop in 2016, i.e. the lack of legislation that was systematically actively attempting to combat the trafficking situation in Serbia.

Additionally, it is clear that anti-trafficking activities and trainings are the most common methods of actions. This could be for multiple reasons. First, activities and trainings typically do not require much funding; thus, it is more feasible to enact more of those actions. Second, this could be because of the parallel findings that awareness/education and prevention actions are the most common types of actions. This positive correlation between them could be because activities typically involve lectures, field activities, and presentations, whereas trainings involve workshops and seminars. All of those actions are designed to educate society on the dangers of trafficking and to prevent future trafficking. Furthermore, as another employee mentioned, the fight against human trafficking has improved over the years due to the increased amount of trainings (Interview, May 5, 2016). The employee stated that trainings help people understand how to treat victims, how to spot potential victims and, most importantly, how to provide for victims (Interviews, May 5, 2016). The data reflects this acknowledgment, as anti-trafficking trainings are the most common actions taken within SATAD. Furthermore, this data conveys that Serbia is actively trying to implement suggestions given to them by the US TIP Report.

Although the actions seem to be increasing, and activities and trainings are both implemented heavily, Serbia is still struggling in certain areas. As the findings confirm, systematic action is the third most common type of action, and composed only 14.2% of the actions in the data. This is a common criticism of Serbia's fight against trafficking as it is mentioned in the US TIP Report (2015) as well as by all of the employees interviewed (Interview, April 22, 2016). Furthermore, this lack of systematic action could be due to the relationship between government institutions such as the CHTVP and NGOs. The US TIP Report (2015) also commented on the need for institutions and NGOs to collaborate and for institutions to refer more victims to NGOs, who have a larger capacity of social protection available for victims.

Moreover, two other main areas that need additional investment are with the intended beneficiaries of anti-trafficking actions. As the findings suggest, children and men are the target beneficiaries in less than half of the actions within SATAD, even though child victims compose almost half of the identified population of victims and child trafficking and trafficking of males are both increasing. As representatives from local NGOs commented, there is a strong need in Serbia to be more active on the child trafficking frontier and to create actions that are specific to the needs of child victims, such as shelters (Interview, May 5, 2016). The same could also be said for men, as there is not a single specific action to help male victims of trafficking. Yet, one employee of a local organization explained that the Center

for Youth Integration runs one of the only prevention programs which combines having a drop-in shelter for kids with a tutoring program that leads to 80% graduating from primary school. They also help Roma people obtain the necessary documents to get a real job, thus also preventing future victimization (Interview, April 25, 2016). However, there is no such prevention program for men in Serbia.

An interesting finding is the lack of reintegration and direct victims assistance actions within Serbia. This is especially due to the criticism of Serbia lacking these actions and the need for them to create actions. However, there are several issues with thinking this way. First of all, even though it appears that there are seldom direct victim assistance or reintegration actions, that is not necessarily the case. For example, even if there are only a few programs that involve reintegration or direct victim assistance, they occur over multiple years, such as the SOS Hotline³⁷ or Atina's Transit House, a house that temporarily provides victims with shelter and basic needs (ASTRA, 2015; Atina, 2016). Therefore, even though these actions may not be the most common, they are rather regular. However, victims need to be made aware of these opportunities when they are identified. An additional important note that is apparent within SA-TAD is that none of the reintegration or direct victim assistance actions were enacted by government institutions. The data conveys that this is also the case for programs and projects. Even

37 The SOS Hotline is run by ASTRA and is the only hotline specifically for human trafficking. It provides information on human trafficking or help for victims of human trafficking.

though programs or projects may not be as frequent, they last far longer than activities or trainings. For this reason, they are the most regular actions in Serbia to combat human trafficking, and are commonly cited by employees of organizations as their most influential action taken to combat human trafficking (Interview, May 4, 2016; Interview, May 5, 2016).

Conclusion

The research benefits the literature on anti-trafficking actions in Serbia in several ways. First, it is one of the only studies that analyze a sample of the types of anti-trafficking action conducted in Serbia over the span of 14 years. Additionally, it is the only study known to the researcher that examines the relationship of the types of anti-trafficking actions per year as well as the methods of anti-trafficking actions per year and the potential meanings behind these findings. The findings present an overview of the anti-trafficking actions in Serbia. There are certain strengths Serbia has, such as enacting many awareness/education and prevention actions as well as activities and trainings. However, Serbia also has areas in which it needs to improve, such as more systematic action, implementing a National Action Plan or Strategy and providing more reintegration and direct victim assistance actions. Moreover, there need to be specific actions for children and male victims, as well as more cooperation between governmental institutions and NGOs, so that they may refer victims to the opportunities that are available to them. Future research should continue to collect and analyze information on the various anti-trafficking actions in

Serbia and to add them to SATAD. Finally, there is a need to evaluate the effectiveness of the various anti-trafficking actions to identify which work and which do not. A major drawback of the current anti-trafficking actions in Serbia is that many of them do not collect data on results of the actions, therefore making evaluation difficult; without such data, and its analysis, it is difficult to allocate funds effectively and efficiently.

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(In)Security Actors and Institutions

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Examining the Presence and Potential of Restorative Justice in Serbia in Cases of Discrimination

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Introduction

Serbia has a painful history of discrimination, as exhibited in the interethnic conflicts of the 1990s. (Nikolic-Ristanovic and Copic, 2013). Although the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are over, there are many unresolved problems. (Nikolic-Ristanovic and Copic, 2013). There is also a history of denial and multiple/opposed truths, as well as the exploitation of people's own victimization that, combined with victim/offender binarism, are used to manipulate national sentiment. (Nikolic-Rista-

novic and Copic, 2013). There are multiple divisions within society along ethnic as well as political lines, (Nikolic-Ristanovic and Copic, 2013).

Serbia's status as a post-conflict society makes it an ideal location for research into restorative justice, particularly within the context of discrimination. Additionally, discrimination exists in forms other than ethnic discrimination, including political affiliation, gender, sexual orientation, disability, etc. (Petrusic, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). The end of the war does not mean that discrimination is no longer present, and so the current analysis into how Serbia deals with discrimination cases is an interesting concept given the history of Serbia. This paper examines how prevalent restorative justice is in Serbia for incidents of discrimination, as well as the potential for restorative justice to grow in Serbia for discrimination cases.

What is Restorative Justice?

Restorative justice is centered on three pillars: harm, obligations, and engagement. (Zehr, 2015). Restorative justice seeks to address the harms caused by the act as opposed to the violation of the law. These harms result in obligations from those responsible for the harm caused, and so restorative justice promotes engagement as a way to address the harm as well as the obligations that exist (Zehr, 2015).

Restorative justice can mean one-on-one mediation between the victim and the offender, or a conference that includes several stakeholders (Braithwaite, 2006). Restorative justice can

take place at various different entry points for offenders during the criminal justice process additionally, restorative justice may have a variety of different roles in the criminal justice process. The practice can be used as a diversion from the entire prosecution process, or can be used concurrently with the criminal justice process (Sherman and Strang, 2007). Restorative justice is primarily focused on victims and their needs. (Zehr, 2015). Restorative justice has also been used and examined for all forms of deviant behavior that causes harm, including violence and even sexual crimes (see e.g. Pali and Madsen, 2011; Sherman and Strang, 2007; Umbreit et al., 2006; Zehr, 2015).

Evidence on Restorative Justice

The implementation of restorative justice has been very successful. The evidence indicates a strong effectiveness in both reducing recidivism and increasing satisfaction for all participants (Latimer et al., 2005; Sherman and Strang, 2007). This evidence is especially true in cases of violent crimes (Sherman and Strang, 2007; Umbreit et al., 2006).

Restorative justice has also been extremely beneficial to victims. Studies have shown that restorative justice reduces victims' symptoms of PTSD as well as their desire for revenge (Sherman and Strang, 2007). Victims have also been found to show near-universal satisfaction with restorative justice regardless of the outcome, indicating a sense of procedural justice (Umbreit et al., 2006; Van Camp and Wemmers, 2013). Part of the reason for this procedural fairness may be the role of the

mediator, which Van Camp and Wemmers (2013) argue play a huge role due to the neutrality, trust, and respect that mediators instill in the victim (see also Pali and Madsen, 2011).

Also evident from the research conducted is the need for clear information on the process of restorative justice, as studies indicate that perceptions of restorative justice can be shaped by the understanding (or lack thereof) that people have of the process (Curtis-Fawley and Daly, 2005; Hill, 2002).

Discrimination and Restorative Justice

Empirically, the field of restorative justice and discrimination has been largely unexplored (Gavrielides, 2012, 2014). Some case studies examining restorative justice being used with discrimination incidents have shown to be very promising, including a case of racial conflict at a high school in Minnesota (Coates et al., 2006), a case of anti-Muslim threats in Oregon shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Coates et al., 2006), and in post-genocide Rwanda, where the ineffectiveness of the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) led to a traditional form of conflict resolution called “Gacaca” (Tiemessen, 2004).

Utilizing restorative justice in cases of discrimination can have many challenges, most notably the competition that restorative practices seem to have with “entrenched practices and the dominant punitive mind-set of criminal justice agents (e.g., police officers, probation staff, judges, prosecutors, and prison staff). This raises some concerns as to how realistic our expecta-

tions can be in relation to its role for race equality” (Gavrielides 2014, p. 224).

Restorative Justice and Serbia

The research on restorative justice in Serbia has explored the possibility of implementing a restorative approach in Serbia and Kosovo to deal with the conflicts of the past (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2006, 2008; Nikolic-Ristanovic and Copic, 2006; Valinas and Arsovska, 2008).

Serbia also faces some challenges in implementing restorative justice, such as the common belief that retribution is the most effective way to fight crime (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2006; Nikolic-Ristanovic and Copic, 2006). The perception is that punishment is “a ‘magic’ solution for crime in general and for the post-war dealing with war crime in particular” (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2006, p. 375).

Despite several barriers facing its implementation it has been argued that there is some potential for implementing restorative justice. While there is a belief that retribution is best, there is still heavy criticism of the traditional justice system, including the fact that the victim is left on the outside and that the underlying causes of the offense are not addressed, possibly leaving the victim in a worse position than before (Nikolic-Ristanovic and Copic, 2006).

Methodology

For this study, five organizations were examined in order to understand the presence and potential of restorative justice in cases of discrimination in Serbia. These organizations are: the Victimology Society of Serbia (VDS), the Child Rights Centre (CPD), the Office of the Commissioner for Protection of Equality (the Commissioner's Office), Nansen Dialogue Centre-Serbia (NDC Serbia), and Partners for Democratic Change Serbia (Partners Serbia). These organizations are all civil-society organizations, with the exception of the Commissioner for Protection of Equality, which is an independent, autonomous, and specialized state authority. These organizations were selected as part of a snowball sample, and were provided from the Victimology Society of Serbia. The Commissioner's Office was the primary source of information for this study.

This study consists of two methodologies: qualitative analysis of the literature of these organizations, and interviews with representatives of these organizations. The content analysis included materials accessible from the websites of each of these organizations, particularly research reports and publications, as well as annual reports. The Commissioner's Office was the primary source of information for this study due to its role as the primary institution dealing with discrimination cases (Petrusic, 2011).

Presence of Restorative Justice

At first glance, restorative justice does not appear to be very prevalent in cases of discrimination in Serbia, as evidenced

by the overwhelmingly small number of cases referred to mediation. Additionally, mediation has yet to actually be completed; it has either been rejected outright or momentarily accepted and then abandoned (Petrusic, 2013, 2014, 2015).

The respondent from the Commissioner's Office (personal communication, 26 April 2016) mentioned several potential indicators that go into determining whether or not a case is suitable for mediation. The first indicator mentioned was that mediation is not offered if the alleged incident involves violence, while cases such as neighbors, family, or working disputes in which the parties should live or work together after the case would be positive indicators (Commissioner's Office, personal communication, 26 April 2016). One additional indicator highlighted by Petrusic and Beker (2012) was that mediation was described as not applicable "when the person against whom a complaint is lodged does not realize that his behavior harmed the complainant (for example, thinking that he did nothing wrong, that his behavior is common towards members of certain groups)" (p. 79).

There do appear to be elements of restorative justice within the mediation procedure that the Commissioner's Office offers. The Commissioner's Office utilizes a specific model for mediation which incorporates elements of victim-offender mediation, or restorative justice, such as voluntariness, confidentiality, impartiality, and neutrality (Nedic and Toskic, 2012). The Commissioner's Office also demonstrates a focus on the

victim's well-being, in line with the values of restorative justice (Zehr, 2015).

There are also elements of restorative justice in the Commissioner's work beyond referrals to mediation. When giving an opinion on a case, the Commissioner may recommend an inadvertently restorative action, such as an apology or even an encounter, according to the regular annual reports (Petrusic, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). One particularly notable example came in the 2014 report (Petrusic, 2015), in which former Prime Minister Ivica Dacic met with representatives of the LGBT group LABRIS, after the Commissioner condemned Dacic for making disparaging public remarks about homosexuals.

Potential for Restorative Justice

One of the main obstacles to instilling restorative justice in Serbia in general and in cases of discrimination in particular, is a lack of awareness. (Child Rights Centre, personal communication, 25 April 2016; Commissioner's Office, personal communication, 26 April 2016; Victimology Society of Serbia, personal communication, 19 May 2016).

Restorative justice is still in its beginning stages in Serbia, though potential for its growth does exist. Research conducted by VDS suggests that there is some support for the use of restorative measures in cases of discrimination (Nikolic-Ristanovic et al., 2014). The Victimology Society of Serbia also took steps towards implementing restorative justice by piloting a program

in the women's prison in Pozarevac (personal communication, 19 May 2016, 25 May 2016). This program was dedicated to instilling empathy and teaching the prisoners about the consequences their actions can have for victims, and VDS (personal communication, 19 May 2016, 25 May 2016) hopes to be able to build from the relative success of that pilot program, in order to make it a permanent program in that prison.

The consensus from these interviews seems to be that restorative justice is still in the very beginning stages of implementation, though it is slowly gaining acceptance. More widespread use of restorative justice in discrimination cases may come over time, depending on the implementation and success of awareness campaigns regarding the issue.

Policy Implications

The extremely low number of people willing to accept mediation should be alarming to proponents of restorative justice, even though there appear to be issues with the Commissioner's Office's implementation of mediation. One of the issues is the limitations on cases in which mediation may actually be offered. The evidence (e.g. Latimer et al., 2005; Sherman and Strang, 2007) does show restorative justice to actually be more effective in cases of violent crimes, and so it should not be discounted outright, especially since mediation is a completely voluntary process. The other restriction that is rather concerning is the claim that mediation is not applicable when the offender does not recognize the act as harmful. This restriction

is problematic because it neuters the transformative nature of restorative justice. Part of the beauty in restorative justice is the fact that victims are able to express to the offender how they were harmed, which can lead to increased empathy within the responsible party. Consideration should be given to expanding the criteria for recommending a mediation procedure.

Another potential practical issue with the mediation process is its role exclusively as a diversionary process within the Commissioner's work. It would benefit the state of restorative justice in Serbia if it could also be offered as a recommendation by the Commissioner following a finding that discrimination did occur. There is a precedent of the Commissioner taking similar action, such as with the recommended encounter between the former Prime Minister and representatives of the LGBT community. Offering a restorative practice as a process following a formal recognition that discrimination occurred could increase the will to undergo a restorative practice.

One last area of concern, which is even referenced by Nedic and Toskic (2012), is the confidentiality requirement for mediation. The Commissioner's Office does not actually have the authority to enforce any recommendation it gives, instead relying on public pressure to "enforce" these recommendations. The confidentiality requirement, however, removes any actual possibility for enforcement of any agreements reached.

Research Implications

There are numerous future studies that could emerge as a result of this study. Since it is evident that restorative justice is still very much in its beginning stages in Serbia, there should be some follow-up research on how this situation changes in the future. It would also be interesting to compare the situation of Serbia to that of another country. Attention should also be paid to the preparation aspect of restorative justice. Numerous studies (e.g. Hill, 2002; Maxwell and Morris, 1993) have referenced the importance of proper preparation for restorative justice. It would be intriguing to analyze what constitutes “good” preparation, considering also the unwillingness of people to engage in mediation.

Summary

The presence of restorative justice in cases of discrimination in Serbia is currently rather limited. Based on the research conducted, there is a lack of awareness regarding restorative practices and their potential, as well as heavy resistance to change within society. There are nevertheless some elements of restorative justice that exist within the work of the Commissioner for Protection of Equality. The mediation process is still very new, having only begun in 2012, and so it will take some time to see how mediation evolves going forward. This study certainly has many implications, both practically and empirically. Researchers and practitioners both have plenty to work from given this research.

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Appendix-Interview Questions

1. Organization Name:
2. Name of Participant:
3. How long have you worked at ...?
4. Were you working in mediation previously?
5. What motivated you to get involved with mediation?
6. When was your organization established?
7. What led to the organization being established?
8. Can you describe what the main activities of your organization are?
9. What type of incidents does your organization typically handle?
10. How are cases referred to your organization?
11. Could you please describe the general process that your participants go through when selecting mediation?
12. Are there any common demographic characteristics for the participants in your program (e.g. gender, age, race/ethnicity, etc.)
13. What is the perception of your program within the community?
14. What are the goals of the program?
15. Could you please describe any challenges that the program has faced?
16. Are you familiar with the term “restorative justice?” If so, how would you define the term?

If participants say 'Yes', move on to Question 21.³⁸

If participants say 'No', I will explain Restorative Justice as An alternative way of looking at crime by instead focusing on a harm caused by the act, and seeking to address this harm by engaging the involved parties in solving the problem. RJ focuses on the needs of those affected by the problem, as well as the needs of the community, and seeks to address these needs by involving the relevant stakeholders in the process.

17. Move on to Question 17.
18. Do you see parallels between programs offered by your organization and restorative justice? If so, what?
19. Do you see any critical difference between programs offered by your organization and restorative justice? If so, what?
20. Do you know of any restorative justice programs being implemented for discrimination cases?
21. Is restorative justice something that your organization is looking to implement?
22. Would you consider your organization a restorative justice program? Why?
23. Do you see any potential for growth of restorative justice in Serbia with cases of discrimination?

³⁸ All participants in this study stated that they were familiar with the term "restorative justice," and so questions 17-20 never had to be asked during this study.



Geopolitical Rivalry of External Players in Nagorno-Karabakh

By Lidiya Chikalova, OSCE Academy, Kyrgyzstan

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began in 1988 with the clash of political ambitions in this historically disputed territory. Tensions between Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated in 1988 and led to full-scale fighting in 1991. The war lasted till 1994. The armed conflict of 1988 took the lives of approximately 40,000 people on both sides. A fragile truce signed in 1994 in Bishkek was violated on April 1, 2016, with a four-day war, which took the lives of approximately 200 people on both sides. The defacto independent republic has turned into a battlefield of external players pursuing their own interests and undermining conflict resolution in the Southern Caucasus region.

The geopolitical rivalry over Nagorno-Karabakh can be examined from several perspectives. It is present on all levels: local, regional and global. On all stages, different actors step in to play different roles. On the local level, three actors are involved in the rivalry – the Republic of Armenia (RA), Azerbaijan Republic (AR) and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. It is important to understand the connection between RA and NKR. Although

Western rhetoric usually portrays the difference between two states, the reality of the situation is different. “Regionally and politically we see two Armenian states, however militarily it is only strategically integrated unit. If we take the geopolitical level, then such specification of Yerevan Armenians and Artsakh Armenians becomes unnecessary, it does not interfere, as one armed force is fighting, a unified command – a unified military management.³⁹” The NKR has political and economic ties primarily with Armenia, due to its nearly uniformly ethnic Armenian population. Armenia is a de facto guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh’s security.

On the regional level, heirs to the former empires step in – Russian, Osman, Persian. States with personal geopolitical and economic interests keep the diplomatic game rolling in favor of dominance and influence. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict becomes leverage for the maneuvering of external players in the regional and global security space.

On the global level, other powerful states like the USA, states in Europe, Israel, and China (in the long run) step in to seek dominance and access to the Caucasus and the Caspian region. Therefore, the overall geopolitical picture of Nagorno-Karabakh is very complicated and dynamic. But the picture is changing

39 Arzumanyan, H., Director at the Center for Strategic Studies «Ashkhar», (2016, July 13), Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, interview.

today with the instability in Russia, Turkey, and Iran, whereas the West is more or less stable in its position.

This paper addresses the interests of major players: Russia, the USA, Turkey, Europe, and Iran on the regional geopolitical arena. I argue that Russia is a leading but no longer primary player in the region, and that the geopolitical standoff intensifies between Russia and Turkey in the region, not between Russia and the West. The rest of the players, like the West, Europe, and Iran, cautiously examine the development of the situation and pursue their own economic interests. The issue becomes important due to recent developments on the line of contact, which have shaken the already unstable security situation in the region. The research goal is to identify the interests of external actors and whether their interests are compatible.

The influence of the Southern Caucasus's region is interlaced with Central Asia and the Middle East. To have influence over the latter two territories seems to be on the agenda of many global powers. Thus, when interests collide, we witness global interactions and a change in the patterns of power relationships among countries. The literature that has been reviewed for this article focuses on primary and secondary sources. Interviews were conducted with political scientists, researchers, professors and governmental officials, who demonstrated their perspectives on Stepanakert and Yerevan. The secondary sources include books by Thomas de Waal, Gerard Libaridian and Svante E. Cornell, as well as numerous literature based on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the interests of external

players. The discourse of the geopolitical rivalry was researched through the lens of the theory of critical geopolitics, developed by Gearoid O. Tuathail (Toal). The theory is still developing and proposes four aspects encompassing foreign policy, including: popular, practical, formal, and structural geopolitics. The concept of critical geopolitics is that intellectuals of statecraft construct ideas about place; these ideas have influence and reinforce political behaviors and policy choices, and they affect how we, the people, process our own notions of place and politics.⁴⁰ This theory fits well with the current realm. Throughout the existence of politics, researchers have approached the geopolitics from the aspects of land and sea aspects, referring to the nature of the state. However, since states do not function in a vacuum but rather in a certain international system, researchers started to take into account developments and changes in the international environment. Today, it is not only geographical conditions that decide the sphere of influence, but also political, economic and cultural. These conditions add to geostrategic significance of a region. Moreover, Dr. Klinke, a UCL researcher, added four key factors that help to structure the understanding of critical geopolitics: space, identity, vision, and statecraft.

The core arguments of this paper are formed around the Russian perspective on regional dominance. First, I argue that Russia is a primary, but not the only influential player in the Southern Caucasus. Second, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a

40 Agnew, J., *Intellectuals of Statecraft*, London, p.34.

battlefield for geopolitical dominance not between Russia and the USA, but between Russia and Turkey. The data was collected in Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from political experts and researchers. As a result of the interview data, several case-scenarios and findings were established. The ultimate case-scenario, which all respondents agree with, was case-scenario B with elements of case-scenario C, i.e., the intensity of the conflict will continue, it will increase and decrease, but serious actions –like war–will not happen again. ---- The peace process will continue without proper conflict resolution. Case-scenario C demonstrates the following; in the wake of the April war external parties to the conflict might decide that serious measures must be undertaken. A decision will be made acceptable for all the actors. In such conflicts, considering the mutual lack of political will, there should be imposed a kind of sensible resolution.

Two hypotheses that were tested throughout the research were partially confirmed. First hypothesis: the Russian stance over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demonstrates Russia as the primary and the only player in the Southern Caucasus. According to the findings Russia is a primary player, but not the only player. Turkey, together with the USA, is balancing Russia in the region. 30% of interviewees agreed that the USA is dominating in the region alongside Russia, whereas 20% stated that Turkey is becoming a powerful state in the region that influences the geopolitical outlay. The remaining 50% of interviewees stated that Russian dominance is prevailing.

Second hypothesis: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a battlefield between Russia and Turkey for geopolitical dominance. This was partially proven as well. The majority of experts referred to Russia-US rivalry by default; however 50% of interviewees pointed out the emerging Russian-Turkish rivalry.

To conclude, the current geopolitical outlay in the region is dictated by three factors: economy, stability, and dominance. The following graph demonstrates the outlay. In the outcome, we see that the US, Russia and Turkey are looking primarily for dominance, while Iran and Europe are looking mostly for stability to perform economic/investment projects.

Policy recommendations

These suggestions refer to the development of critical geopolitics theory and the necessity of closely tying it to the geopolitical outlay schemes in the Southern Caucasus region.

Russia, the USA, Europe, Turkey, Iran and several international organizations, like the OSCE Minsk group and the UN, are all interrelated and are part of the current status quo in the region. Every actor, whether on the local, regional or global level, has formed necessary knowledge about the Southern Caucasus region. This thought serves as guidance in foreign policy. Moreover, created knowledge is promoted through formal geopolitics, i.e. academics, governmental officials, think tanks, etc. The created thought, which is now formed in foreign policy, turns into political discourse, i.e. practical geopolitics. The discourse makes the space meaningful through wide arrays of ideas and

geopolitical actors, like academics, journalists, etc. The discourse is broadcasted to the masses, creating a geopolitical gaze and dividing up the world into various spaces and spheres of influences. Such a vision of popular geopolitics is usually easy to transfer to people, forming propaganda in a sense as it loses objectivity. The last step of the cycle is the formation of certain thoughts – identity, which the state is always re-negotiating. What matters here is the way in which spatial communities such as nations, ethnic groups or other forms of spatial organization construct group identity through references to a spatial ‘We’ and an often threatening and aggressive ‘Them’ located in a fundamentally different territory. This is what lays in structural geopolitics.

Further development of the theory can help clearly formulate foreign policy patterns, which can then be applied to geopolitical approaches to the external actors involved in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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New Security Realities: Recalibrating the Role of Security Organizations in South Caucasus

By Ani Grigoryan, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia

Introduction

The security architecture of the South Caucasus, despite its comparatively small geographic size, represents quite a robust and contradicting landscape, with a basket of internal and external factors dramatically challenging the stability in the region. Located at the crossroads between the East and the West, it has occasionally drawn the scrupulous eye of various international players, including security organizations, to its existence. This research paper sheds light upon the role of regional security organizations, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article explores the following questions:

1. What are the NATO and CSTO main strategies as registered in the respective strategic documents on which their activities are anchored?

2. To what extent can NATO-CSTO bilateral relations be characterized as cooperation: what are the challenges threatening friendly relations?
3. Is the South Caucasus fragmented or integrated between these two military blocks?

It is worthwhile to mention that given the vast extent of cooperation between the South Caucasus and the above-mentioned security blocks, the paper on the one hand focuses on bilateral relations between the CSTO and NATO on the other along with shedding light upon factors and major developments hindering the process of integration and hence a stabilization in the whole region.

This research is carried out from the perspective of comparative analysis, taking into account official announcements, interviews, and expert opinions and analysis, as well as major documents, agreements and charters on the question under consideration. On a theoretical level the article studies such core concepts as security, collective security and strategy, which are the basis of the policy of the two security blocks. Last but not least, the national security doctrines of separate states are explored (Russia and Armenia) with the aim of gaining better understanding of the core issues conditioning bilateral relations. **The main strategic planning of NATO and CSTO towards the South Caucasus region: an unrealized case of cooperation?**

The South Caucasus represents a mutually exclusive strategic platform for both NATO and the CSTO, thus bringing all par-

ties to the notion that confrontation rather than cooperation is still on the agenda.

The study demonstrates that the cooperation between NATO and CSTO remains unrealistic not only because of competing interests in the region but also given the inner characteristics of the security organizations. NATO and CSTO, commonly referred as two competing military blocs, are normally discussed in terms of confrontation rather than cooperation. And this is well grounded by the fact that aside from terrorism, nuclear proliferation and international drug flow, there is hardly another sphere bringing them to the realm of cooperation.

In this regard, two main similarities and one major difference are outlined between these two security blocs. The similarities include the fact that there is one dominant power carrying the financial burden of the organization. The second concerns the ideological aspect of the two. They are in constant search of a justification of their existence. However, there exists a major difference between them. The security and political visions of the members of the blocs coincide in major aspects; however in the case of the CSTO, member-states have various, sometimes contradictory, political and security aspirations. The NATO strategic concept adopted in 2010 overwhelmingly emphasizes 'defense and deterrence,' 'security through crisis management,' and 'promoting international security through cooperation' as the core tasks to be fulfilled under the auspices of NATO.⁴¹

41 Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.

The CSTO is often referred to as an attempt to counterbalance NATO and fortify its status as a security superpower as well as a political superpower in a world shifting into multipolar reality, thus re-establishing Russia's presence in the former Soviet Union countries. The CSTO mainly focuses on strengthening crisis management, military technology and military economy as well as various international organizations as allies⁴².

In the context of NATO-CSTO interplay, NATO-Russia relations should also be taken into account. Russia does not exclude possibilities of cooperation with NATO as it will create: 1) favorable foreign conditions which are necessary to implement successful domestic modernization policy, 2) reconciliation with Washington, which relations with NATO influence greatly, 3) the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture where NATO will preserve itself as a major power.⁴³ However, slow Russian military transformation⁴⁴ will inevitably result in new NATO-Russia and consequently NATO-CSTO relations, namely in the sphere of cybersecurity and intelligence warfare.⁴⁵

Various factors have made NATO and CSTO cooperation unrealistic in the South Caucasus region. Experts and professionals in this field are skeptical of the possibility of cooperation in the security sphere in the broader sense (except energy security) between NATO and CSTO. They also appear skeptical

42 Retrieved from <http://consult.telros.ru/assets/files/Borduzha.pdf>.

43 Retrieved from http://www.riocenter.ru/files/MiniBook_NATO.pdf.

44 Russia's Military Transformation, retrieved from <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf>, p. 13.

45 Dick, C. (2003, April) The Future Of Conflict: Looking Out To 2020, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 44.

of NATO's deeper engagement in stabilizing the situation in the South Caucasus, given the experience of the Georgian war in 2008, Armenia's membership in the CSTO, and the "mutually exclusive strategic interests of regional states."⁴⁶ However, this does not undermine the possibility of cooperation with NATO on the part of individual South Caucasus countries.

Armenia has cooperated with NATO⁴⁷ while being a fully-fledged member of CSTO. Armenia-NATO relations have proved themselves quite dynamic, with two parties having gained extensively in terms of capacity-building, experience and expertise sharing. At the same time, Armenia continues its membership in the Russian-led CSTO, chairing the organization's 2016 sessions. Armenia remains dependent on its alliance with Russia.⁴⁸ At the same time, it is common knowledge that Armenia is receiving armaments from Russia. Armenia is the only country that has been contributing both to NATO and the CSTO.

The security architecture of the South Caucasus is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, given a number of geopolitical and geostrategic priorities, such as the relations between Iran, Turkey and Russia, and a more assertive Germany. There are also a number of internal issues, such as CSTO transformation and NATO's internal problems with the "two-percent" and "open door" policies.

46 Retrieved from <http://cenaa.org/analysis/armenia/>.

47 Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48893.htm#.

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Conclusion

Given the constantly clashing interests of international players in the volatile South Caucasus region, there remains little hope for cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. However, there is room for reconciliation measures if a number of agreements are met on an at least organizational but more importantly state-to-state level.

The following factors continue to increasingly affect relations between the two organizations:

- The ideological crises of NATO and the CSTO that could bring about unexpected result in the region,
- The asymmetric structure of the CSTO, which makes bilateral relations difficult and gives weight to the relations not between NATO and the CSTO, but between Russia and NATO,
- Individual partnership with member states without pushing membership into NATO as a prerequisite for reinforcing security in the region.

Proceeding from this, the following policy recommendations are offered:

- ✓ Armenia should continue cooperation with NATO within the framework of different actions as adopted by NATO,

- ✓ NATO should follow the agreements with Armenia providing more opportunities for the Armenian military to learn and benefit from the NATO infrastructure,
- ✓ The CSTO must not be an obstacle for more advanced NATO-Armenian relations, as far as it does not contradict or violate bilateral agreements between Armenia and the CSTO.

This research paper has focused mainly on the current state of affairs. In terms of further study, individual interviews with various officials would shed more light on the internal logic and the main mechanisms fuelling the activities of both organizations.

Changing Security Settings

Session Chair: Benjamin Cole, Simmons College, USA

Discussant: Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Duke University, USA and American University of Armenia



The Concept of Political and Religious Imāmah (Leadership) of Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL)

By Mariam Mkhitarian, Yerevan State University, Armenia

Introduction

The establishment of an Islamic caliphate has been the dream of millions of Muslims all over the world. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the abolishment of the institute of khalīfah (Caliph, Viceroy) the Islamic community was eventually separated. The rising volume of nationalism in different Arab and non-Arab states made the community forget the notion of ummah (Muslim community) for some period of time. During the 20th century, the Muslim world was busy creating states and nations, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat were trying to do in Egypt. This was also happening in Pakistan and other parts of the Muslim world. But time showed that the

Muslim identity could be silenced. In the 1970s, different Islamic groups started to recall the establishment of the caliphate and announce Sharia as the main source of law. These developments led to the emergence of Al Qaida and various other groups. The rise of the Islamic State (IS), which is a consequence of these movements, eventually led to the establishment of the long-awaited caliphate. A caliphate claims religious, political and military authority over all Muslims. However, in order to gain this authority, the group has to prove that it represents the only true leadership among all other Islamic groups and connect its lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. In this way, their leadership becomes lawful and they become able to gain the trust of Muslims.

This research aims to show how the Islamic State justifies its declaration as the only true leadership, and the methods, mechanisms and literature used to support them.

Methodology

The research was done based on the official English language magazine of the Islamic State, *Dabiq*⁴⁹ and the Russian-language magazine *Istok* (The source), video and audio recordings of Islamic State leaders, and the Quran and Sunnah (Prophetic narrations). The main ideas of the Islamic State regarding the leadership are summarized in the first issue of *Dabiq* and *Istok* magazines. In explaining the meaning of political and religious leadership in Islam, I have used several facts and points that the

⁴⁹ The name comes from the name of place in Syria that is supposed to be the location for one of the final battles of Islamic eschatology.

Islamic State has used to justify their caliphate. I have used the method of historical comparison between the ways the Islamic community solved the problem of leadership after the Prophet Muhammad's death and how the Islamic State tries to prove its lawful leadership over all Muslims. I have also done semiotic and textual analyses of the sources.

The concept of Imāmah in Islam

Imāmah literally means to lead. *Al-Imam* means the leader. In Islamic terms, "*Imāmah*" means the universal authority in all religious and secular affairs, in succession to the Prophet. At the core of the idea of the imamate lay the assumption that the Muslim community must have a legitimate leader who would be responsible for, as Islamic jurist Abu Hasan al-Mawardi (972-1058) noted, "upholding the faith and managing the affairs of the world" including such duties as implementing laws, defending borders, leading the army, maintaining social peace, collecting and distributing revenues, and appointing administrators to undertake such responsibilities.⁵⁰

The Sunni school of thought's starting point for understanding the concept of "*Imāmah*" is to give the title of *Imam* or *khalīfah* to the elected political leader of the Islamic State, whose responsibility lies in managing various aspects of the affairs of the Muslim populace. They arrived at this conclusion after referring to the Quran and Sunnah, without having found a clear statement defining the role of the successor of the Holy.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Ali, A., (1996), *Islamic dynasties of the Arab East, State and Civilization during the Later Medieval Times*, Springfield: M D Publications, p. 156.

⁵¹ Bowering, G. (2013), *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*, Princeton, p. 249.

Therefore, the next logical step was to refer to actual events in the post-Prophetic era for the method of electing a leader, after arriving to the conclusion that a political vacuum would be detrimental to the unity and strength of the young Islamic state. Hence, the Shura⁵² council was adopted as one method, then, the first incumbent (who was elected), nominated and appointed his own successor. The Sunnis made the point that the imamate was by election and that the community was the source of legitimacy; the “*Imāmah*” was neither a dynastic right nor a divine appointment. The people who used to elect the *imam* needed to have certain qualifications such as knowledge and wisdom.⁵³ Generally the Sunnis required that the candidate belonged to the tribe of Quraish⁵⁴ (the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad) although some well-known scholars, like Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), argued that the candidate can be from outside Quraish, including non-Arabic-speaking people.

Since political leadership is a “matter of the people,” it becomes logical that the Shura elects its leader and manages its own affairs, pointing to this Quranic verse as the evidence being their logic “and their rule is to take counsel among themselves.”(Q. 42:38)

The modern Sunni attitude toward the question of the *Imāmah* has varied. The need for an *Imāmah* defined by religion is sometimes completely denied, as in the tract on the caliphate endorsed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. There

52 Consultative council.

53 Esposito, J. (2009) *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World*, Oxford, p. 167.

54 Al Biladuri, A. (2011), *The origins of the Islamic State*, New York p. 36.

hasn't been a caliph since the Ottoman Empire. Others have advocated the restoration of a universal *Imāmah* modeled upon the ideal caliphate of ar-Rāshidūn⁵⁵.

Though the caliphate was abolished, at different times various Muslim scholars and political and military groups have called for its restoration. Moreover, most of them used to see in the face of caliphate the salvation for the Muslim community; the existence of separate states, from their standpoint, was the main reason for all problems that existed in the so-called Muslim world. The restoration of caliphate was called for by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) the founder of the Muslim brotherhood organization, by the famous Muslim preacher Abu Ala al-Maududi (1903-1979), who used to claim that "Caliph is required to exercise the Divine authority,"⁵⁶ and by other Muslim scholars.

The concept of Islamic State's Imāmah

Among the above-mentioned groups that had in its plan the re-establishment of caliphates the Islamic State, previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The militant group that started its activity in early 2000s as Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, then as a part of al-Qaeda, eventually managed to take over in Syria and Iraq in 2013 with the guidance of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Over the course of 2013 and 2014, ISIS quickly took

⁵⁵ Rashidun is a term used in Sunni Islam to refer to the 30-year reign of the first four caliphs (successors) following the death of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, namely: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman ibn Affan and Ali of the Rashidun Caliphate, the first caliphate.

⁵⁶ Esposito, J. (2009), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World*, p. 172.

over territory in Syria and Iraq, and eventually in June 2014 the spokesman for the Islamic State, Shaikh Abu Muhammad Al-Andani announced the revival of khilāfa (the caliphate) and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph. The necessity of declaring a caliphate is described in a statement called “This is the promise of Allah,” which was released by the Islamic State in 2014. The Muslim world is presented in sin, ruled by non-pious leaders, while the caliphate came to implement Islamic law and create the correct model of society, where Muslims will be able to live according to Allah’s rules. The declaration of khilāfa is explained in a prophetic narration which states that “There will be prophethood for as long as Allah wills it to be then He will remove it when He wills. Then there will be khilāfa on the prophetic methodology and it will be for as long as Allah wills, then He will remove it when he wills. Then there will be harsh kingship for as long as Allah wills, then He will remove it when He wills. Then there will be tyrannical kingship for as long as Allah wills, the He will remove it when he wills. Then there will be khilāfa on the prophetic methodology.”⁵⁷

Accordingly, the “Iraq and Shām” in the name of the Islamic State was removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name became the Islamic State from the date of that declaration. If the power and attorney of the Islamic State was kind of limited between the territory and Muslims of Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State became a universal model of Muslim governance that does not recognize any

⁵⁷ ‘This is the promise of Allah,’ retrieved from http://myreader.toile-libre.org/uploads/My_53b039f00cb03.pdf.

border limitations and any national belonging. In his first public speech, the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, even mentioned that the Islamic state was a place for Americans, Russians, and Caucasians who were united under one goal and under one flag.⁵⁸

Believing in democracy and nationalism is described as heresy, while submission to the caliph is a sacred duty of each Muslim; they can get what they were promised by Allah if they are united.

Imamate in the understanding of the Islamic State includes both political and religious leadership equally.

In the Islamic understanding, religion and the state cannot be separated. The majority of Muslim countries are secular states where there is a clear distinction between the state and the religious affairs. Though in some countries, like Egypt, the Islamic law, Sharia, is introduced in the law and constitution, these states are mainly secular. The separation between the government and Sharia and the state and religion is defined as the main reason behind the instability and poverty of these states.

The Islamic State refers to this leadership not only in religious but also political affairs. As described in Dabiq, "Furthermore the people today have failed to understand that Jmāmah in religious affairs cannot be properly established unless the peo-

⁵⁸ ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, first Friday sermon as so-called 'Caliph', retrieved from <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdidi-first-Friday-sermon-as-so-called-Caliph-.html>.

ple of truth first achieve the comprehensive political Imāmah over the lands and the people.”⁵⁹ There is no alternative way of governance for the Islamic State.

The appointment of Baghdadi as khalīfah raised questions among the Muslims who have already given their baya’h⁶⁰ to so-called local leaders and imams; the existence of two imams, with some exceptions, is not permissible, and there is a prophetic narration saying “If baya’h is given to two khalifas then kill the second of the two.”⁶¹ The Islamic State officially justifies this case by saying that these are territorial leaders whose authority does not exceed their territory. The existence of such leaders is necessary inasmuch as they can help protect those whom the imam’s supervision does not reach. But they will be ministers. The Islamic State mentioned in Dabiq that khalīfah is similar to the case of water wudu, which is the default, and those territorial leaderships are like tayamum,⁶² which is an alternative allowed when necessary.

59 Millah of Ibrahim, Dabiq 1, p. 4.

60 Bay’ah is an oath of allegiance to a leader.

61 Ali, A. (1996), *Islamic dynasties of the Arab East, State and Civilization during the Later Medieval Times*, Springfield: M D Publications, p. 180.

62 Act of dry ablution.

The lineage between the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the prophethood

The cornerstone of getting leadership is defined as the fulfillment of God's words and commands. That is why the prophet Ibrahim got the leadership. It is mentioned in the Quran that when Allah granted the position of Imāmah to Ibrahim, he understood the importance of that event and requested it for his descendants as well by saying "And also leaders from my offspring (Quran 2:24)." God told him that his covenant does not include the wrongdoers. So it becomes clear that Ibrahim's fulfillment of Allah's commands is the direct reason he achieved Imāmah; it would only be fitting that these same commands become the reason for his descendants after him to attain this tremendous position. Therefore, the Islamic State tries to introduce themselves as the only entity that mostly emulates the creed of Ibrahim (believe in one God) with regards to Imāmah in the areas where it exists and where they think they have established the true religion of Allah. All this happened after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi came to fight for the cause of Allah.

As I have already mentioned, one of the main criteria of being a caliph is the belonging to the al Quraish tribe. The Islamic State tries to connect Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's lineage to this tribe. He is described in the declaration as "the slave of Allah, Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Badrī al-Hāshimī al-Husaynī al-Qurashī by lineage, as-Sāmurrā'ī by birth and upbringing, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by residence and scholarship. And he has accepted the bay'ah.

In the full name of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is mentioned the name of prophet Ibrāhīm Ibn, Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm. This is a very important point. In Muslim tradition, the Arabs are the descendants of Ibrahim's son, Ismail. It is believed that Muhammad's tribe, al-Quraish, emerged from Ismail's line. In this manner, Muhammad's ancestry leads back to Ismail. To be clearer, the chain is like this: Abraham-Ismail-Al Quraish-Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The noble lineage of Baghdadi is intentionally emphasized in the literature of the Islamic State many times. This gives him all the rights to get the leadership and secondly legalizes the rule of the Islamic State. Their leadership is introduced as something derived from millah Ibrahim (creed of Ibrahim) and their victories and consolidations as an unquestionable Imāmah. As such, anyone who rebels against it is considered a renegade and it is permissible to fight them.

Conclusion

Taking into consideration the above, it becomes clear that the Islamic State explains its steps based firmly on traditional Islamic sources.

When going deep into the ideology of the Islamic State, we can see how their preachers handily explain how they restored the long waited caliphate and what gave them the right to do so. In my research, I tried to explain the methods used to legalize the leadership of the Islamic State and show what gave them the right to call all Muslims around the world to join their

ranks by claiming that they have both the religious and political leadership over them.

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We and Others: The Model of Divisions of the World According to Islamic State

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Introduction

The collapse of Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the “*khilāfa*”⁶³ (Caliphate) stimulated the process of the prosperous development of fundamental Islamic thought and the creation of fundamental Islamic organizations, some of them radical. The main goal of these organizations is the recreation of “*khilāfa*” and the reestablishment of an Islamic Ummah. To achieve these goals, fundamental Islamic organizations need to stop the weakening of the Islamic identity.

This is one of the main goals of the “Islamic State” and its leader, Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Qurayshī al-Baghdādī. According to the Islamic State, the creation of a national identity countervails the ideology of a “united *Ummah*” created by Allah.

63 The IJMES Transliteration system was used for Arabic.

Methodology and selection of data

In order to understand how the Islamic State divides the world into friends and foes, I employ a combination of several methods. Thematic and textual analyses helped to highlight the parts of the Islamic State's text related to the division of the world. Along with these methods, I use the historical method to answer questions concerning historical context [1]. A considerable role also was given to semiotic analysis [2].

My research is based on analyses of speeches and messages from the leader of the Islamic State well as the official English-language and Russian-language magazines of the Islamic State. I analyzed four video and audio speeches and messages from Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Qurayshī al-Baghdādī: his speech at Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq (July 5, 2014) and audio messages called “Even if the disbelievers despise such” (November 13, 2014), “March forth whether light or heavy” (May 14, 2015) and “So wait; Indeed, we, along with you, are waiting.” (December 26, 2015) In addition to these speeches and messages, I have also analyzed issues 1-12 of *Dabiq*,⁶⁴ the Islamic State's official English-language magazine, and issues 1-3 of *Istok*, (*The Source*), Russian-language magazine.

The concept of “We”: “We are believers and followers of Prophet Muhammad”

The declaration of “*khilāfa*” on IS-controlled territories by the Islamic State in 2014 and the call of *jihād* are the steps nec-

⁶⁴ The name comes from a name of a town in northern Syria.

essary to achieve the restoration of a united Ummah. Its success consists of many layers, the main of which is creation of the “we’s” identity based on Islam⁶⁵ and the opposition of it to the “others,” the enemies.

The Islamic State uses new markers of identity step-by-step, erasing the old ones. One of the primary steps is to emphasize the fact of belonging to a society based solely on religion. The aim is to underline the equality of the fighters from different countries and nations. We can find the same in the actions of Prophet Muhammad. Al-Baghdadi tries to do in IS-controlled territories what Muhammed did in Medina. [3]

Jihād, which is “the duty of every Muslim,” is considered as an important component of religious identity [3] [4]. In this context, Islam was presented as the religion of the sword. A *Dabiq* article entitled “Islam is the religion of the sword not pacifism.” begins with the criticism of Muslims who consider Islam as the religion of peace and then states that “*Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword.*” [5, pp. 20-21]

Along with *Jihād*, one of the main preconditions for belonging to the religion-based community is the severing of old ties to acquire a new “family.” These fighters are called “strangers,” those who left their families and their lands, emigrating for the sake of Allah and for the sake of establishing His religion. In the “era of *ghuthā’ as-sayl*” (the feeble scum), they are the “*most*

65 Islam which is acceptable for IS.

wondrous of the creation in terms of faith, and the strangest of them all.” [6, p. 8]

The basis of this idea comes from the *Hijrah*⁶⁶, when *muhājirs*⁶⁷ broke ties with their tribes and departed from Mecca to Yathrib (today’s Medina), preferring brothers by faith to their blood relatives. The *Hijrah* became the basis for a new model of community based on Islam. This explains why the Islamic State uses the word “*hijrah*” when calling Muslims to these territories of the IS. The above can be summarized in a sentence from Dabiq. “*Hijrah will not cease as long as there is jihad.*” [7, p. 18]

The image of the trusty person for the Islamic State is made clear in an article in *Istok* entitled “Who are we, from where and to where?” in *Istok*. In this article, the Islamic State replies to two questions: who are they and what is their goal? The Islamic State notes that they are the believers of Holy Scriptures, sent to the world as a true guide; they are believers and followers of Prophet Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah. They are the owners of the wealth of Islamic lands. [8, p. 31]

The concept of “Others”: “They don’t dare to come, because their hearts are filled with fear of the mujāhidīn”

The image of man who is loyal and obedient to Allah, who goes to Jihād for Allah, is in contradiction with the image of the enemies of the Islamic State. To make clear their viewpoint and

⁶⁶ The Prophet Muhammad’s migration (622 CE) from Mecca to Medina.

⁶⁷ The term means immigrant. Muhammad’s companions who left Mecca for Medina in what is known as Hijrah.

to contradict “we” with “others,” the Islamic State divides the world into “ours” and “theirs,” which creates a division of the people itself.

This tendency can be noted during the whole of Islamic history. Islamic traditional thought throughout the centuries divided the world into different parts. The main two parts were Dār al-Islām (the House of Islam) and Dār al-Harb (the House of War). During the centuries, other concepts, such as Dār al-‘Ahd (House of the Covenant), Dār al-Sulh (House of Treaty), were created. [9] However, from the beginning, the Islamic State called for Hijra showing that its territories are Dār al-Islam, while everything out of it is Dār al-Harb. The declaration of the “*khilafa*” strengthened this approach. The Islamic State does not use any mitigating terms, which brings us to early Islam.

The Islamic State declared such kind of approach in the first issue of *Dabiq* when they published the words of al-Baghdadi with the title “The world has divided into two camps.” Al-Baghdadi said that indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of *kuf*r (disbelief) and hypocrisy. [10, p. 10]

According to al-Baghdadi’s words, the second camp, Dār al-Harb, is itself divided into many parts. The segmentation of Dār al-Harb was described in an audio message from al-Baghdadi from November, 2014.

Based on speeches from the leader of the Islamic State, I divided the camp of their enemies into 4 main parts: 1. Americans, Jews and their supporters, 2. Leaders of Arab countries whom al-Baghdadi calls the West, Americans' servants, 3. Shias (ar-Rāfiḍa), 4. Those Islamic organizations that don't give bay'ah to al-Baghdadi.

However, this separation is conditional and the categories are often mixed in the texts of the IS.

1. Americans, Jews and their supporters

When talking about the first group, Islamic State leaders use the word "crusade." The meaning of this word is often changed. For the Islamic State, the Jordanians, Japanese, Jews, etc. are crusades if they oppose the Islamic State. For instance, before citing Henry Kissinger, the Islamic State refers to him as a "Jewish crusade." [11, p. 39] Similarly, before beheading two Japanese captives, the Islamic State presented them as "Japanese crusaders." [12, p. 4]

Interestingly, even the Muslim can be presented as a "crusade". The IS referred to the Jordanian pilot who was burnt alive by the "Islamic state" as "*the Jordanian crusader pilot.*" [12, p. 5]

2. Leaders of Arab countries whom al-Baghdadi calls West's, America's servants

The second group is composed of those countries with Muslim-majority populations whose leaders do not acknowledge al-Baghdadi as the caliph. The Islamic State presents them

as “Servants and slaves of America, the West.” [13] The same claim is seen in a message from December 26, where al-Baghdadi emphasized Arabic countries and especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, mainly addressing “the sons of the lands of al-Haramayn” (the two sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina). [4]

It is not surprising that the Islamic State especially underlines the role of Saudi Arabia, taking into consideration that this is the country in which the main holy cities of Islam are located Al-Baghdadi reflected on this question during his speech from November 13, 2014, in which he addressed the Muslims of Saudi Arabia: *“O sons of al-Haramayn... O people of tawhid⁶⁸... the serpent’s head and the stronghold of the disease ate beside you. Thus, draw your swords and break their sheaths... There is no place for the mushrikin⁶⁹ in peninsula of Muhammad... Deal with the rāfiḍa, Āl Salūl⁷⁰ and their soldiers...”* [14]

3. Shias (ar-Rāfiḍa)

The attitude toward the third group is the strongest: Shia-Sunni antagonism comes from the earliest years of Islam’s history.

In a speech addressing Yemenis, al-Baghdadi notes: *“O sons of Yemen... be harsh against the Houthi Rāfiḍa, for they are kuffar apostates.”* [14] The same call is given to the people of Mecca and Medina, where al-Baghdadi notes the order of

68 Tawḥīd means the oneness of God.

69 Mushrikūn are those who practice idolatry or polytheism.

70 Derogatory name for the Saudi royal family Āl Sa’ūd.

destroying their enemies :firstly, Rāfiḍa, then Āl Salūl and their soldiers, and then the Crusades and their bases. [14]

Hostility toward the Shias is reflected not only in the speeches of al-Baghdadi but also clearly in the actions of IS militants, including suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia's Shiite mosques. What's more, in al-Baghdadi's message, Shias are presented as the allies and spies of Christians and Jews. [4]

4. Those Islamic organizations that don't give bay'ah to al-Baghdadi

This group consists of those who want to do the same as the Islamic State: reestablish united Umma, Sharia law, "clear Islam", etc. The problem is that they did not give the bay'ah⁷¹ to al-Baghdadi. Thus, they are rivals of the IS. Their views on these groups are presented in the *Istok* article "The law of Creator, or Created law." [15, p. 17] According to this article, all rival groups are part of "dastardly betrayal" except "some small groups." [15, pp. 17-28]

The main fault of these groups the Sharia law. The IS states that even if some of them claim to live according to Sharia, in reality they use Jāhilīyah's⁷² policy. The Islamic State sees "Muslim brotherhood"⁷³ as one of these groups. Another fault is the

71 An oath of allegiance to a leader.

72 Pre-Islamic period when monotheism and divine law were ignored.

73 Islamist organization founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar Hassan al-Banna in 1928.

how these groups are financed. The IS reassures that their finances come from ṭāghūts. [15, p. 21]

Conclusion

Analyzing the actions taken by the Islamic State and the content of speeches given by its leaders allows me to conclude that the Islamic State is in process of creating an identity based on religion, which. I argue that they will not manage to make dominant. This identity in many cases depends on military success, as far as al-Baghdadi put the successful march of his fighters in the core of his leadership. From his point of view, this success has been given from Allah to the Islamic State. Al-Baghdadi seeks to do what Muhammad did. But it should be taken into account that in the case of Muhammad, the early period of Islam was marked by the creation of the Arabic Caliphate and Muslim conquests. This unprecedented success helped Muhammad and the first caliphs to strengthen a victorious Muslim identity. In contrast to this, the Islamic State's success was obvious only during its first period. This success was followed by setbacks, and the IS lost many lands. These failures counter the idea of "Allah's victorious army" and will hamper the ability of Salafi-based identity to become dominant. It should be noted that, even if the IS tries to erase nation-based identity and replace with a purely religion-based one, they are not successful. We can see Islamic State brigades of Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, etc., which means that national identity is still alive.

Additionally, the extreme approach to the “others” makes the IS much more vulnerable. The IS cuts off all means of cooperation by declaring the whole world hostile. It can be concluded that while, for centuries, Islamic thought created many concepts to mitigate the concepts of Dār al-Harb and Dār al-Islam, the Islamic State does the contrary by using a two-part world model. But as the situation changes, the ideas are changing as well. In this context, the concepts of “we” and “others” are subject to change. At this moment “we” consists exclusively of those who fight under the flag of the Islamic State. In the case of the “others,” there are several types of enemies, and the Islamic State shows the order in which they must be fought.

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Corruption, Poverty and Human Security

Session Chair and Discussant: Babken DerGrigorian, London School of Economics, UK



Globalization, Market Economy and Global Security

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Globalization in the modern sense of the term was first used in the 80s of the last century. In general, it refers to the political, economic and cultural unification (integration) processes of the modern world and the global nature that lead to the formation of a united and multinational society.

The goal of this article is to combine the theories and the facts of globalization to substantiate the view that the key function of globalization is not in the development of international relations and interactions, or in information technology, but first of all, in humans. This means that the “power factor” and

“desire to rule” that can affect humans are also key to understanding globalization.

Although “Globalization” refers to the processes of unification, its philosophical and psychological roots are at the beginning of the story of nations.

It should also be noted that in space and time the “scales of gravity” of world power is changing. The center and the periphery change places over time. In this sense, to perceive “globalization” as “Westernization” is acceptable only for a certain period, probably from the 19th century till the end of the 20th century.

The problem of globalization is not the human desire to dominate, but the fact that the motive for globalization is the attempt to give this desire a legal basis. “When talking about world unity, the meaning is the unity of power are referring to a group of people who should project, lead and rule over all the earth and the whole humanity,” wrote Karl Schmidt, criticizing efforts to create “global unity” in the middle of the last century. In cases where the natural example of social unity, which is not opposed to nature, the nation, a sociocultural unit, is formed on the basis of ethno-cultural space, and develops over millennia.

National unity is characteristic for national countries, and inside them are shaped political and civil nations. Such unity is formed through common history and culture.

Globalization

What is globalization? There is still uncertainty regarding this term, and the new world order after the Cold War is not clear. Thus globalization can be perceived as a myth, an ideological phenomenon. Beginning in the 1990s, globalization has become a cornerstone of public and academic discussion.

In fact, economical, ideological, technological and cultural globalization are all interconnected changes in the general formulation. Economic changes are the internalization of deepening and intensifying economic interdependence and the growing mobility of capital and transnational corporations.

Economic reflections of globalization also involve significant restructuring of production, relocation outside of the country, changes in the volume of financial markets, consumer goods identical to the whole world and extensive population transfers.

Ideological changes provide investment, trade liberalization, privatization and the development of democracy.

Technological changes include the dissemination of information and communication technologies and a shift from products to services around the world. Finally, cultural changes tend to smooth the tastes and standards adopted within the framework of a global culture. According to Holm and Sorensen, globalization can be defined as follows: the intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations beyond state borders. This is more than the geographical spread of problems

and phenomena. Globalization implies not only a global reach but also a realization of attachment and affection as the result of conscious relaxation space. Globalization is due to many factors, the most important being technological changes. But this process is not consistent in speed and geographic perspectives, and as a result we have a variety of globalizations in different regions.

It is important to identify the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of globalization. For example, economic globalization leads to a global economic system which is not based on national economies but consumer goods production, consumption, and distribution carried out by a combined global market. Thus the word globalization is used often but rarely defined clearly. Possible definitions can be:

1. Intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations
2. The historical period that began at the end of the Cold War
3. Transformation of the global economy caused by uncontrollable financial markets
4. The values of the triumph of economic and political neoliberalism
5. The social consequences of the technological revolution

6. The inability of states to solve global problems which require global solutions, such as environmental protection, human rights violations or the spread of nuclear weapons

The economic definition of globalization captures the most attention from the world, and can be formulated as follows: an inefficient system of free trade agreements, Internet, and integration of financial markets, which leads to the elimination of borders. In addition to the edge of economic globalization, it is also necessary to study the political and social aspects of a qualitative transition. A low level of economic accountability and transparency is a serious problem as transnational economic and political systems are not accountable to the elected governments of nation-states.

Globalization is increasingly embracing peoples of all countries in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres of world affairs.

A majority of Armenians view globalization favorably and feel that international trade has a positive impact on their economy and on individual well-being.⁷⁴

- 65% of Armenians say that globalization is “mostly good” for Armenia.

⁷⁴ Retrieved from http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jun07/CCGA+_FullReport_Armenia.pdf.

- Three-quarters (75%) view international trade as good for the economy and nearly two-thirds (64%) view it as good for Armenian companies.

- A majority believes that international trade is good for Armenians as individuals: 60% say it is positive for their standard of living and 56% for them as consumers.

- A majority (61%) thinks international trade helps create Armenian jobs but only a slim majority thinks it is good for their job security (52%).

- Most (79%) think “minimum standards for working conditions” should be part of trade agreements.

- Attitudes about the effect of international trade on the environment are mixed: 37% believe it is good, while 36% say it is bad, and 27% decline to answer.

- Four out of five Armenians (82%) think environmental protections should be incorporated into trade agreements.

- Opinion is mixed about whether the Armenian government should comply with adverse rulings from the World Trade Organization: 35% say it should not, 26% think it should, and 24% say it depends.

Conclusion

For developed Western countries global market competitiveness of the national economy and its branches, along with various trends and developments in the global economy, ensures the free market viability of the country and is therefore considered “safe,” for participants in the international division of labor and actual market competitor economies, economic freedom and competition leads to certain risks and rewards.

The main characteristics of a market economy are freedom of entrepreneurship, market pricing based on proposal and demand, contractual relationships between the economic entities, minimal interference of the state in the economy, and diversity of ownership of the means of production.

Market economies have advantages such as the efficient use of resources, operational flexibility, the promotion of scientific and technological progress and the promotion of the improvement of the quality of products. But it also has drawbacks, such as vulnerability to external influences, lack of public services, the asymmetry of information acquisition, the existence of social problems, and the existence of monopolies.

One of the key features of international relations in recent decades is globalization.

Armenia is still in a stage of transition; internal and external factors make it difficult to ensure economic security. In such

conditions, the creation of an economic security system is becoming a priority.

If we choose the path of the West, it passes through globalization, which will lead Armenia to European integration without undermining our national spirit and originality, if, of course, we care to preserve our national values ourselves.

If we have any active role in the overall process of globalization, we will be able not only to develop our economy, but also to preserve the cultural values and create a new level of quality and access to the world community. If we have an active role with no resources to resist the globalization process, we will lose confidence in our values, including also national.



Poverty and human security: Human security in southern Africa

By Azniv Meltonyan, Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia

I. First Words

The chapter of the last century is a rather happy one because of all the inventions and innovations that have helped us to improve the lives of many. Today we are living a different reality. Our endeavor has brought us to a watershed, a crossroads, a decisive moment. Today we're able to understand our nature better than ever, and, in the process of enlightenment, we have stumbled upon a couple of alarming challenges. It is obvious that now they grow as globalization and new technologies have made the world more connected.

II. Introduction

There is no stability without solidarity, and no solidarity without stability.

- Jose Manuel Barroso

I would like to think that 2016 is a great year. Recent years have been characterized by loud, frustrating, and often unresolved discussions about justice for those who are most vulnerable and most in need of help. Of course, even if those discussions do not always lead to results, it is of high importance that people talk. It is significant that we live in a world where everyone can be vocal about their needs and wishes. However, writing this, I feel a little voice in my mind reminding me of all the disasters that still surround us.

We still witness hunger being a murderer, education being denied, rape being excused. We are still living on a planet where people feel discriminated against due to race, gender or belief. There is still war and conflict. Worries about international security and peace remain because of our need for development; they are the prerequisites of developing further.

This growth implies that many nations around the world, with their cultural, economic and historical differences, have to cooperate to improve their realities. Lack of development is not an isolated phenomenon. There are about 150 countries where two-thirds of the population of the world lives in poverty. According to the latest World Bank estimates, in Southern Africa, more people are poor today than in 1990, two in five adults are still illiterate, and violence is on the rise. The share of Africans who are poor fell from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012 (World Bank). However, because of population growth, many more people are still poor in Africa (World Bank).⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Retrieved from <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA>.

Alleviating poverty seems like wishful thinking, considering the appalling state of millions of vulnerable individuals and the undeniably extensive wealth-poverty gap. Access to good schools, safe water, healthcare, electricity and other critical services remains intangible for many people who live in developing economies (World Bank). The most vulnerable people need assurance that they will be supported and protected in the face of economic and social change. However, with the appropriate government policies in place, the most vulnerable can rise above expectations and work towards a sustainable future for themselves and their families.

III. Let's eradicate extreme poverty and hunger!

It may be difficult to think about and talk about environmental problems and sustainable development since we've been facing these problems for decades, yet the reality is cruel. Today many people suffer from inequality and real deprivation. Human security encompasses the multiple causes of these circumstances: food insecurity, health insecurity, environmental insecurity, personal insecurity or community insecurity. All these threats correlate and can cause a chain reaction. For instance, a violent conflict leads to poverty which could in turn lead to a loss of basic resources and disease. National borders are not barriers in this respect. A conflict or a flood in one country can easily spread to another, affecting regional or international security. Prevention is really the strongest tool. And hu-

man security teaches us how to work towards prevention and turn the odds in our favor.

As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

- Abraham Lincoln

Formulating goals is a powerful means to move development forward. However, these goals do not allow us to pick and choose. They should be formulated and implemented in a process of intercultural collaboration, recognizing that people live different lives all over the world, but that there are common goals that are worth pursuing together. To have not abstract wishes, but concrete goals. To reach sustainable solutions that work for the present and future generations.

To eradicate poverty and hunger in southern Africa it is imperative to motivate each country in the world to redistribute its budget so that more money is spent on education than on the military and weapons export, as education is the most powerful tool to establish a better understanding and respect between countries. For example, two or more countries may work together to solve shared concerns; this can be done through their students who are involved in scientific research or in any kind of activity that works to solve a problem in their country. Student cultural exchange groups stimulate a better understanding of the differences and similarities between countries. They combine and create novel ideas for developing the weak systems in

their home countries. People in southern Africa need to know how to preserve the environment.

Furthermore, the southern African region shares the aforementioned problem with the rest of the continent and it is important for each part to receive potable water, safe shelters, proper education, and an appropriate livelihood as befitting their rights and needs. This is not a particular regional problem; it is a cry for a global change when it comes to the openness of high quality health care, economic medicine, and vaccines. Humans become discouraged, depressed, and aggressive when they believe that their rights are violated. Thus, they are more likely to start wars and fights with others who receive such rights. When each part is treated equally, they are less likely to fight with each other.

We should make references to the defense and promotion of culture and language as important values in the pursuit of development and poverty eradication. Culture enables sustainability – as a source of identity, social cohesion, and a way of helping people make sense of the future. Development policies responsive to cultural contexts yield stronger and more sustainable development outcomes. The cultural sector is also a driver of sustainable development which generates income, creates decent jobs and improves livelihoods. Culture fosters a sense of individual well-being and encourages greater understanding and respect for social and cultural diversity at the national level.

In addition, promoting multilingualism across the region is another significant goal to achieve. Speaking multiple languages is imperative in order to understand the common themes in various cultures. In other words, when people speak a foreign language, they normally have a better understanding of the life and culture of people speaking that language. Requiring primary-level and higher educational institutions to teach their students at least one foreign language is one way to promote intercultural knowledge and communication. Different languages encourage the flow of ideas and technology between groups. Besides, the bigger the cultural differences are, the more productive the conversation will be, and that means more innovation. But this is only possible if both sides are committed to hearing each other's opinion. It is not about cultural similarities, but the will, patience and openness to hear one another.

Providing food security and safe shelter should be sustainable goals as well because future generations have the right to dignity and a high-quality life. However, we should not harm our nature and environment for our benefit. There are various ways to provide safe shelter and food for humanity besides deforestation and the excessive hunting of exotic and domestic animal species. Providing basic human rights does not mean that more trees should be cut down or more animals should be killed. It is about creating smart ways to obtain shelter and food. For instance, the spacious lands of deserts across the southern Africa region can be utilized to provide safe shelter for people. It is quite understandable that deserts are severe environments,

but it is not hard to make use of science to provide safe water and food for people to live in such areas as, for example, Laikala (a village in Tanzania). Very often, because of climate change and a lack of rain, the native people suffer from insecurity. They become vulnerable as the rain stops early and they do not have food. Because of the rain conditions and the baking sun their harvest is poor; the crops dry out, and the maize does not grow fully. These conditions are also difficult for farming as livestock will die. The farmers depend on the rain to go out and farm. Human security can find operational solutions to eradicate this problem and help those people.

In summary, even though humans across the world differ in their lifestyles and cultures, they share common problems and concerns. Poverty, malnutrition, lack of proper education, and discrimination are some of the many widespread issues in the world. Fortunately, human security recognizes those problems and works hard through the preparation and implementation of agendas to resolve the most common issues humankind faces. When human security is compromised, we have an immediate change in the status of security. There is no room for failure. Human security needs to create both regional and national plans to make sure that those people in Laikala who are dependent on farming can continue to farm.

VI. We have come so far. We have much further to go.

I would like to think that 2016 is a great year. I am sitting here next to my mother writing my paper and various people, friends have passed asking:

“What are you up to?”

- *“I am trying to phrase my thoughts on human security and poverty.”*

“On the what?”

- *“Global Security Studies (GSS), you know. This is a new global agenda drawing upon experiences of different countries for GSS.”*

All I got is confused and embarrassed looks. But once I explained the context and points involved, incredulity turned into understanding. Understanding turned into intrigue. And in a few cases intrigue turned into anger, wondering why the world is enveloped in so many issues. And in some cases this anger turned into engagement, activism and propagation of knowledge. This is the starting point for me: trying to get as many people as possible involved and aboard. In my, maybe naive, narrow-minded imagination, I believe that once people will be enlightened about this one-time historic opportunity to seek improvements in the lives of millions of people and to save the world, they will be in favor, they will want to fight for this mission. So...

Let's keep moving forward together!

Politics of Peacebuilding and Security Provision

Session chair: Stepan Khzrtian, Center for Excellence in Negotiation Yerevan
Discussants: Stepan Khzrtian, Center for Excellence in Negotiation Yerevan
Armenia, Isabella Sargsyan, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Armenia



International Territorial Administration as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism: Possibilities and Challenges

By Marine Kirakosyan, Brusov State University, Armenia

Following the end of the Cold War, the international community started to perceive threats to international peace and security in a much broader framework. As a result, the internal situations essentially placed within the domestic jurisdiction of states gradually acquired international importance, creating space for large-scale international involvement in war-broken states. A pure state-centered approach to territorial governance and authority has been challenged by the renewed practice of International Territorial Administration (ITA), which still lacks a clear-cut legal basis and is mostly regarded as a subject of customary international law.

This report regards the post-Cold War cases of ITA within three scenarios that have been viewed as a threat to international peace and security, seeking to reveal the role they play in the conflict resolution process and the challenges facing them. It concludes with recommendations regarding ways to increase the efficiency of these missions.

There is no commonly agreed-upon definition of ITA. Some authors describe it as a transitional mission aimed to facilitate the establishment of a new state, or at least to promote the achievement of substantial autonomy⁷⁶. Others stress its importance from a security perspective, with a major emphasis on the guarantee of human rights and the rule of law as well as the maintenance of sustainable peace and stability.⁷⁷ A much broader definition offered by Wilde defines ITA as a strategic mechanism through which international actors exercise their authority or control over particular territorial units on the basis of a local government system.⁷⁸

The legal authority of initiating territorial administrations stems from the UN Security Council Resolution adopted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which has been practiced since the case of Eastern Slavonia in 1996. The chapter refers to measures

76 Caplan, R. (2002) *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn Territories*, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies); De Brabandere, E. (2009) *Post-Conflict Administrations in International Law: International Territorial Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice*, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,

77 Chesterman, S. (2005) *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building*, New York; Oxford University Press.

78 Wilde, R. (2010) *International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away*. New York; Oxford University Press..

taken with respect to threats to peace and acts of aggression. Before taking measures under Chapter 7, the Security Council is required to guarantee two preconditions:

- According to Article 39 of the UN Charter the UN Security Council must precisely determine “any threat to international peace or breach of it and acts of aggression.”
- The measures undertaken should serve the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.⁷⁹

The determination of the first condition is regularly open to contradictions, as the Security Council is not bound by any legal criteria in determining that internal situations constitute a potential threat to international peace or security. Leaving space for discretionary power in determining such situations is not surprising, given the so-called “double standards” practice in relation to conflict settlement processes. However, based on the contexts in which territorial administrations have been established, I suggest singling out three scenarios that have been viewed as a threat to international peace and security:

1. Impediment to people’s right to self-determination
2. State failure
3. Internal situations capable of threatening regional stability

⁷⁹ Baskin, M. (2004) Between Exit and Engagement: On the Division of Authority in Transitional Administrations, “*Global Governance*” 10: 1, p 119-137.

One can argue that the first and the third scenarios generally go hand in hand, for although self-determination conflicts seem to pertain to a particular territory, they are closely connected with regional and even international dynamics. Since 1990, almost half of the world's conflicts have been related to self-determination movements that seek greater autonomy or statehood.⁸⁰In most of these cases, claims for self-determination have been severely confronted by the metropolitan powers through human rights abuses, including genocide. East Timor and South Sudan are illustrative in this respect.

1. East Timor is among the most complicated ITA cases given the fact that the establishment of the UN Interim Administration (UNTAET) was not triggered by the systematic massive violations of human rights in the course of two decades of occupation, but its more or less predictable outcome – the attempted genocide initiated by the Indonesian government. The grave humanitarian crisis following the population's vote for independence has been qualified by the Security Council as a threat to international peace and security. Similarly, the twenty-year war of separation between North and South Sudan caused more than two million deaths and resulted in millions of displaced persons.⁸¹ Although the civilian and military international presence both in East Timor and South Sudan stopped human rights

⁸⁰ Toft, M., Self-Determination, Secession, and Civil War, terrorism and Political Violence 24:4. Retrieved from <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate-WilliamsP-20160315.pdf>.

⁸¹ Sudan (North-South Ethnic War) (1983-2005). Modern Conflicts, Political Economy Research Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Sudan1.pdf>.

violations and triggered the emergence of a new state, it did not in itself reduce the potential risk of destabilization.

As Williams and Pecci argue, the destabilization risks within ITA practices may arise in two contexts: when a state even after a long period of institution building remains incapable of exercising effective authority, and when the new state's existence in and of itself creates a destabilizing political dynamic.⁸² The first is the case for both East Timor and South Sudan – former colonies which, following the withdrawal of colonizing powers, were occupied and annexed by the neighboring countries. Hence, the UN was faced with the absence of any self-organizing and self-government practice, and had to deal not only with the status questions and the issues of governance and local capacity building, but the “transformation of social consciousness” – the immediate effect of a colonial past. The status question has been effectively resolved, giving birth to Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2002) and the Republic of South Sudan (2011). However, the lack of what I will call “preparation for independence” found its expression in the 2006 crisis of East Timor and the ethnic violence in South Sudan a month following its independence in 2011.

2. The most dangerous type of international presence is when it acquires a continuing nature. Both states discussed above are at present under some kind of international supervision. This practice is particularly common to the context of de-

⁸² Williams, P., Pecci, F. (2012) Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, *Stanford Journal of International Law* 40:1.

colonization, following a full devolution of powers from international to local actors. Particularly in cases where the transfer of powers is initiated all at once without clearly outlined phases, the resurgence of new clashes seems inevitable. Following the civil war in South Sudan in December 2013, Security Council Resolution 2155 (May 27, 2014), reinforced the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and reprioritized its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.⁸³ Similarly, three additional international missions have been carried out in East Timor since it gained independence. This prolongation may be regarded as a kind of label in regarding a particular state as a failed one. It can be stated that at the internal, level the so-called failed states present a real danger to the well-being of the local population, particularly from a human rights perspective. However, as Brabandere notes, “in the context of the authorization of the Security Council to take actions in respect of a threat to international peace and security, the label of state failure cannot be limited to mere internal aspects. The fact that the state is malfunctioning internally is not enough to hold that it cannot maintain itself as a member of international community.”⁸⁴ It is indeed only when a state presents a real threat to international peace and security that

83 “Protecting Civilians, Monitoring Human Rights and Supporting Implementation of Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.” United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/>.

84 De Brabandere, E. (2009) “Post-Conflict Administrations in International Law: International Territorial Administration”. *Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice*. Leiden.:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

the Security Council may impose preventive measures. There are no clear-cut criteria the Security Council is bound by in determining such situations. Thus, one cannot evaluate the impartiality of the decisions made with regard to the establishment of territorial administration.

3. The notion of “peace” in the sense of Chapter 7 is far more than the absence of war between states. For instance, in the case of Iraq in 1991, the Security Council was gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, including in Kurdish populated areas. This led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region.⁸⁵ Likewise, the establishment of an international administration in Kosovo largely stemmed from regional security considerations clearly wrapped in internal destabilization. Since 1998, the Kosovo conflict has turned from a civil war fought mainly along ethnic lines into a regionally confined cross-border conflict which included not only the Kosovo Liberation Army, Serbian security forces and the special police of the Ministry of the Interior, but also contingents of many NATO member states. Although the war did not spill over into Albania and Macedonia, it had massive effects on a deteriorating refugee situation.⁸⁶ According to an OSCE report in 1999, military clashes and ethnic-cleansing operations caused

⁸⁵ Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), retrieved from <http://fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.html>.

⁸⁶ Narten, J., External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Case Studies. The report has been commissioned by Freie Universitat Berlin for a comparative project on the international factors shaping transitions to democracy in post-conflict countries.

mass displacement and the expulsion of over 450.000 people to neighboring states. Thus, following the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations and NATO's intervention, the UN established an interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) to advance the regional stability in the Western Balkans that was affected by the Kosovo crisis. Moreover, in Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the UN welcomed the initiative of international organizations towards the implementation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.⁸⁷ Unlike the decolonization context, where the UN was largely engaged in governance issues, the major problem during the international supervision of Kosovo was the uncertainty of the territory's political status. Even though this was a case where status issues were expected to be a step further from those pertaining to territorial governance given the practice of self-government, the status question gained secondary importance. The result was the resurgence of new military incidents in 2004, in which many people were wounded, killed and displaced. This made the international community revise the implemented policy (standards before status) and paved the way for independent statehood in 2008. Hence, in the context of ITA, the uncertainty of political status could be easily placed among the destabilization factors mentioned by Williams and Pecci.

⁸⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), retrieved from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf>.

Regardless of the lack of a firm legal basis and despite being mostly justified within customary international law, the practice of ITA proves that in some conflict settings it may turn into an effective tool of conflict resolution. To this end, several points should be made clear at the outset of conflict:

- International supervision needs to be established for addressing concrete problems in the short run with regard to specificities of a particular territory (whether it has or not self-government practice, whether it is vulnerable to new crisis, whether claims of independent statehood are made on firm grounds, etc). Put another way, the missions are to be authorized based on clear-cut mandates.
- Determination of status and declaration of independence do not necessarily entail territorial stabilization. Some conflict territories (mostly those characterized by the lack of any self-organizing practice) require a gradual devolution of powers to avoid the resurgence of armed clashes.
- The continuing presence of international administrators in a host territory, if not properly justified, may produce a contrary effect. This is particularly true for new states prone to dependency from international assistance.

After all, the ultimate objective of territorial administration is the prevention of new external administrations and all the measures taken by the international community should eventually serve for this purpose.



Frozen Conflicts as a Global Security Threat: The Crimea Crisis

By Hripsime Sargsyan, Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia

Frozen conflicts play a vital role in international relations as well as in global security today. Parallel to the rise in conflict numbers, the problems concerning global and territorial security are increasing day by day. There is both a threat of escalation of frozen conflicts and emerging new cases all over the world.

A. Bolshakov defines frozen conflicts in the following way: “Frozen conflicts are the conflicts that have not received political regulations yet, but are already out of the stage of direct armed confrontation.”⁸⁸

The Crimean conflict is one of the most topical and essential issues in modern global politics. Indeed, the Crimean peninsula, which has an important role in the Black Sea Basin, has been the subject of heated discussion. The conflict in Crimea has resulted in the deterioration of relations between the Rus-

⁸⁸ Большаков, А. (2008), «Замороженные конфликты» постсоветского пространства: тупики международного миротворчества, ПОЛИТИЯ 1:48 с.27-37.

sian Federation and the West and remains an important issue from the perspective of global security.

This paper aims to determine whether the Crimean conflict can be considered “frozen”. To achieve this, we have set out the following objectives: to study the Crimean conflict within the scope of international law, to determine the causes of the conflict and its consequences, to understand whether East and West are guided by values or interests, and to emphasize the role of the Crimean Peninsula as an important strategic territory in the Black Sea Basin. I argue that, when these factors are examined, it is evident that this conflict can destabilize global security.

Russian scholars such as L. Grishaeva view the reunion of the Crimea with Russia as a “restoration of historical justice.”⁸⁹ As for the restoration of the historical justice, in 1954 there was not a quorum necessary to transfer the Crimea into the USSR. This issue has been observed by such authors as O. Usacheva in her article “On the Question of the State Ownership of the Crimea” and O. Matveev in his article “The Crimea in the Ukrainian Crisis: History and Politics”.

Critics of the conflict in Crimea cite the right of self-determination as determined by the United Nations. G. Tsikunov argues that “Based on the principles of international law, legality of the reunion of the Crimea with Russia is confirmed.” Citing the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly

⁸⁹ Гришаева, Л. (2014), Россия, ООН и крымские санкции, Экономический журнал, 3:35 с. 2-9.

Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, he states that “the principle of territorial integrity is unacceptable for Ukraine, which does not provide security for the people living in the Crimea, and which does not allow their free self-determination.”⁹⁰

Generally, in order to understand the true nature of conflicts it is necessary to examine their causes. V. Tomsinov, the Chair of History of State and Rights at the Faculty of Law at Moscow State University, is in favor of the principle of self-determination in this case. He gives legal assessment to the re-union of the Crimea with the RF from the point of view of the norms and principles of international law and past resolutions to such situations, in particular the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. He argues that the people of the Crimea have enough legal grounds to realize the right to self-determination through separation from Ukraine. “The state revolution made in Kiev on 22 February in 2014 put the radicals into power. Their first steps and announcements showed that the withdrawal of the Russian language and culture was almost the most important purpose of their activity. From this point of view, the people of the Crimea had all the grounds for making decisions about the impossibility to provide the right to self-determination within the scope of Ukraine.”⁹¹

90 Цыкунов, Г. (2015) Историко-правовые основы вхождения Крыма в состав РФ, Историческое развитие, 25(3)с. 550-555.

91 Томсинов, В. (2014) «Крымское право» или юридические основания для воссоединения Крыма с Россией, Вестник Московского университета, 2с. 3-33.

The right to self-determination is confirmed as one of the most important purposes of *the United Nations Charter*. One of the purposes of the United Nations is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”⁹² While all other fundamental principles of international law set out the rights and obligations of states, the principle of self-determination proclaims not only rights and obligations of states but also the rights of non-state actors – namely of the people.⁹³ Several other documents relate to the right to self-determination, among them the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

A referendum is usually held in order to get out of a state’s territory. It is the best way to express people’s free will. The population in Crimea participated in a referendum as a result of which the majority voted for joining the Russian Federation. Numerous surveys making the empirical basis for the present research proved that the absolute majority of the population of the Crimea considered the peninsula to be Russian.

It is important to determine whether the presence of Russian military forces had an influence on the referendum. The survey carried out by the GfK Ukraine, as ordered by Berta Communications and supported by Canada Fund for Local Ini-

92 Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>, (accessed June 8, 2016)

93 Seidel, G. (2002) A New Dimension of the Right of Self-Determination in Kosovo, p. 20.

tatives, stands out for its impartiality. The survey, carried out by phone March 12-14, 2014, showed that the majority of the population of the Crimea was determined to vote for joining the Russian Federation. Among the respondents there were people from various age groups, towns and villages.

Among the questions of the survey were “Would you like to have an alternative but for the points mentioned in the voting papers?” or “Does the presence of the Russian military forces have an influence on the referendum?”⁹⁴ The answers were mostly negative. It is worth mentioning that the company carried out another survey a year later, the results of which showed that even more people were in favor of joining the RF.

In the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations there are notes both about the right of nations to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states which the countries must respect. However, the principle of territorial integrity works in those cases when the state provides all people living in that territory with equal rights.

Having observed the reasons for the Crimean conflict and the nature of the conflict, we can conclude that the Crimean conflict is not frozen, taking into account that there were no armed clashes between the Crimea and Ukraine. The conflict can be considered to be resolved because the Crimea is now a

⁹⁴ Public opinion survey in Crimea, retrieved from http://avaazpress.s3.amazonaws.com/558_Crimea.Referendum.Poll.GfK.pdf (accessed June 8, 2016).

part of the Russian Federation, though its reunion with the RF is unacceptable for the most of the western countries.

The Crimea has become the reason for the deterioration of relations between the US and the RF, which can lead to the insecurity of the whole world. Moreover, there has always been a constant struggle for political dominance. The Crimean spring is a phenomenon which changes the positions of the pieces on the chess board of international relations. Thus, the interest and response of the international community to the Crimean conflict is preconditioned by its being an important strategic territory in Black Sea Basin. As A. Shirakarad puts it, “The country that possesses the Crimea, possesses the Black Sea.”⁹⁵ Indeed, the Crimea is the place where global issues on world order have been solved.

⁹⁵ Широкоград, А. (2014), Непотопляемый авианосец Крым. 1945-2014, Вече, Москва, с. 2.

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